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JOSEPH DOHERTY AND THE INS: A LONG WAY TO
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
INTRODUCTION

The concepts of political asylum and extradition both date back to ancient

civilizations.1 Political offenders have fled their countries of origin in search of

safe havens, and their countries of origin have demanded their return. This
cycle of flight and return is played out on the background of nonrefoulement.
Nonrefoulement is the right of refugees not to be returned to a country where

they may face persecution. This principle is a customary international norm
that protects both the interests of the requesting country and the interests of
the political refugee.
Nonrefoulement safeguards the interest of the country requesting extradition in combating international terrorism since it is not available to fugitives
who have committed terrorist acts. On the other hand, nonrefoulement protects the political offender by ensuring that he will not be sent to a country

where he may face persecution. Nonrefoulement is based on human rights and
humanitarian law, and is embodied in many extradition treaties and asylum
statutes.
This Note analyzes the principle of nonrefoulement in relation to the case of

Joseph Doherty.' Doherty fled to the United States in 1981, escaping a life
sentence imposed upon him in Northern Ireland for his participation in the
fatal ambush of a British Security Forces captain. From 1983, when Doherty
was arrested by Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") officials, until February 1992, when he was deported to the United Kingdom, Doherty
fought both his extradition and deportation to the United Kingdom.-

This Note begins by examining the history of nonrefoulement and its incorporation into extradition and asylum law. The Note then describes the Do1. See AESCHYLUS, THE SUPPLIANT MAIDENS (an ancient Greek play about both the asylum
and the extradition of Egyptian princesses).
2. There are three lines of Doherty decisions. The first line focuses on his extradition hearing.
See In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), motion to dismiss petition on collateral
review granted, United States v. Doherty, 615 F. Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 786 F.2d 491
(2d Cir. 1986). The second line of cases focuses on Doherty's asylum hearing. See Doherty v.
Meese, 808 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1986) and Doherty v. INS, 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 60
U.S.L.W. 4085 (1992). The third line of cases focuses on Doherty's efforts to secure his release
from jail. See Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1991).
3. See James Barron, I.R.A. Fugitive Sent to Belfast from U.S. Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
1992 (nat'l ed.), at Al; John J. Goldman, U.S. Sends Former IRA Member Back to Britain, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at AI; U.S. Deports IRA Member Convicted in Killing,Cm. TRIB., Feb. 20,
1992, § 1, at 2 [hereinafter IRA Member].
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herty cases and provides an illustration of how nonrefoulement applies to both
extradition-under the political offense exception-and deportation and asylum-under the mandatory withholding of deportation and the discretionary
asylum statutes. The final section argues that nonrefoulement protects the
rights and interests of Doherty, and should have prohibited his return to the
United Kingdom.
I. BACKGROUND

Nonrefoulement is embedded in international law, which has developed over
the last several hundred years. International law develops from the practice of
states,4 or customary law, and "by purposeful agreement by states," or "conventional law." 5 International law is derived from three different sources: (a)
"international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states"; 6 (b) "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law"; and (c) "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 8 As nonrefoulement is an international custom, this Note will focus on the; second source of international law.
The second source of international law, customary norms, is binding on all
nations. 9 International customary law consists of two components: (a) "a general and consistent practice of states," and (b) a belief by the states that the
practice is mandatory.' Evidence of state practice is reflected in governmental
acts, official statements of policy, diplomatic acts and instructions, public measures, and a state's inaction."
4. A state is defined under international law as "an entity that has a defined territory and a
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or has the
capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1986).
5. See id. § 101 intro. (1986).
6. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l) (comprising an integral part of the
United Nations Charter). This article is generally accepted as a concise statement of the sources
of international law. See P. Hyndman, An Appraisal of the Development of the Protection Afforded to Refugees Under International Law, I LAWASIA 229, 265 (1980).
7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(l).
8. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(I) (1986) (listing the three sources of international law as "(a) in the form of customary
law; (b) by international agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the
major legal systems of the world").
9. Hyndman, supra note 6, at 265.
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)

(1986). This second component often is called opinio juris, meaning the state believes that it is
under a legal obligation to adhere to a practice. Id. cmt. c.
For cases outlining the two components of customary international law, see North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. and F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (using customary
international law principles to resolve a boundary dispute between West Germafiy, Denmark, and
the Netherlands over the North Sea Continental Shelf); Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J.
266, 276-78 (Nov. 20) (using customary international law to rule that Colombia had violated
Article 2 of the 1928 Havana Convention Regarding Asylum).
1I.See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
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In the United States, courts have enforced international law for over two
centuries. Both conventional and customary international law are considered
federal law. 2 Customary law is similar to federal common law. 13 Numerous
examples exist that demonstrate that international customary law is an integral part of United States domestic law." The Supreme Court has stated that
"international law is a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction .. ..,,5 When
United States statutes conflict with international law, courts should strive to
construe the statutes consistently with international law.' 6
cmt. b (1986).
12. See id.§ 111 cmt. d.
13. Id.
14. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)
(ruling that Cuba could not escape liability for acts in violation of international law simply by
retransferring assets to separate juridical entities); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)
(determining that it is an established rule of international law that coastal fishing vessels are
exempt from capture as a prize of war); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) (using the law of
nations to determine that a neutral ship lawfully may employ an armed belligerent vessel to transport goods); Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. 111 (1784) (finding that the defendant had
violated the law of nations by assaulting a French national); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980) ("[Deliberate torture perpetrated under the color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of international law of human rights."); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980) ("[llndeterminate detention of petitioner in a maximum security federal prison . . . constitutes arbitrary detention and is a violation of customary international
law."), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1981); United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551)
(deciding that a French ship engaged in slave trade was subject to condemnation both by the law
of nations and the municipal law of France); Hanfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 6360) (holding that the federal judiciary has jurisdiction over an offender who violated the
law of nations); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102 cmt. j (1986) ("[Clustomary law and law made by international agreement have equal authority as international law."); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1558 (1983) (discussing the transition from the law of nations under Swift v. Tyson to
the interdependence of the law of nations as well as international law under Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins).
15. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. The Court further stated that "for this purpose, where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators." Id.,
see also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1820)
(Story, J.) (determining that United States courts had jurisdiction under the law of nations to
prosecute the defendants' act of "piracy"); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81 (holding that the United
States courts had jurisdiction over an alien defendant whose deliberate torture violated norms of
international human rights law); ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (1971) (explaining that international law is based on the way representatives of
states perceive it); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law. 47 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 1,1I (1974) (discussing the development of international law through custom); Theodor
Meron, Geneva Convention as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 367 (1987) (discussing the
relationship between the Geneva Conventions and customary law).
16. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (noting that it is a maxim of statutory
construction that statutes be construed consistently with international law); Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[United States statutes] ought never to be
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The principle of nonrefoulement prohibits a state from returning refugees to
a territory where the refugees are likely to face persecution or danger to their

'life or freedom.

7

This principle is found in many international covenants, as

well as in state practice. An examination of the history of nonrefoulement as it

appears in conventions and in state practice reveals that this principle has developed into a customary international norm, which some scholars have
deemed to be a peremptory right. 18
A.

History of Nonrefoulement in International Conventions

The term "nonrefoulement" is rooted in the French word refouler, which
means "to drive back or repel, as of an enemy who fails to breach one's defenses." In the immigration context of continental Europe, refoulement was
a term used to cover "summary reconduction to the frontier of those discovered to have entered illegally and summary refusal of admission of those without valid papers." 2 0
The principle of nonrefoulement was conceived in the mid-1800s.21 An early
documented example of nonrefoulement was the United Kingdom's Aliens Act
of 1905.2 This Act allowed persons fleeing-, political or religious persecution to
enter the United Kingdom.2 3 Other count:xies were slow to follow the United
Kingdom's lead, and it was not until after the First World War that
nonrefoulement emerged as a principle in many international agreements.24

construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains .... ); see also
Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990) (analyzing the application of the Charming Betsy case to
domestic statutory construction). But see Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J.INT'L
L. 143 (1984) (arguing that United States statutory law takes precedence over customary international law).
17. Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (1983). A state also may
not send a refugee to a country that may return the refugee to a state where the refugee believes
he would be persecuted. See Robert K. Goldman & Scott M. Martin, International Legal Standards Relating to the Rights of Aliens and Refugees and the United States Immigration Law, 5

HUM. RTS. Q 302, 313 (1982).
18. See infra note 104 and accompanying text (listing scholars who maintain that nonrefoulement is a peremptory right).
19. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 69.
20. Id.

21. During the mid-1800s, Europe and South America experienced political unrest, which resulted in the migration of citizens to other countries. The Russian and Ottoman pogroms against
Jewish and Christian minorities also led to mass migration. The principle of asylum and nonextradition of political offenders began to form and provide refugees some protection. Id. at 70.

22. Id. (citing Aliens Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, oh. 13).
23. Id. (citing Aliens Act, 1905, 5 Edw. 7, ch. 13, § 1(3)). Article 1(3) applies to those "seek-

ing to avoid prosecution or punishment on religious or political grounds or for an offence of a
political character, or persecution involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or limb on
account of religious belief." Id.
24. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 70. Prior to the development of the principle of
nonrefoulement, neighboring states would contract among themselves for international criminal
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1. The League of Nations (1922-1946)
After World War 1, several organizations and international agreements
were created to ameliorate the immense refugee problem left in the wake of
the war. The most prolific of these organizations was the League of Nations.
Its charter went into effect on January 10, 1920.2'
The League was created to secure international peace by "the firm establishment of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments." One of the League's many functions was to ensure fair treatment to
the large number of refugees following World War I. During the League's
1933 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 2 7 the principle of
nonrefoulement was seen for the first time in an international setting.2 8 Although the term "nonrefoulement" was not expressly used, Article III of the
1933 Convention embodies the concept. It requires the parties not to "remove
or keep from [their] territor[ies] by application of police measures, such as
expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier [refoulement], refugees who have
been authorized to reside there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated
by reasons of national security or public order.12 9 However, Article III lacked
force, as only eight states ratified the Convention, and three of those states
expressed official reservations to the nonrefoulement provision. 30
cooperation by establishing mutual obligations to surrender subversives, dissidents, and traitors to
the countries that sought them. Id.
25. I INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1970).
26. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT pmbl., reprinted in I INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1, 2
(Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1970). The Preamble further states:
In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace
and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription
of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the
understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, the powers signatory to
this covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations.
Id.
President Woodrow Wilson is credited with the inspiration for the League in his famous Fourteen Point Plan. Unfortunately, the United States Congress refused to approve United States
membership into the League, and the League remained largely ineffectual. See JULIA E. JOHNSEN,
LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3 (1924).
27. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, art. 11I, 159
L.N.T.S. 201 (official text in French) [hereinafter 1933 Convention).
28. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 70.
29. 1933 Convention, supra note 27, art. Ill. The two exceptions for public order and national
security are typical in the early nonrefoulement provisions. See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 67-68 (discussing other exceptions to the principle of nonrefoulement).
30. The eight participating states include Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Norway, France, and Denmark. 1933 Convention, supra note 27, at state signatories. Czechoslovakia reserved the right to expel aliens who posed a danger to the safety of the state and public
order as well as those subject to expulsion under existing extradition treaties. Id. Egypt reserved
the right "to expel such refugees at any moment for reasons of public security." Id. Italy reserved
the authority to expel refugees "for reasons of national security and public order." Id.
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Two agreements submitted to the League by Germany in 19361 and 1938"2
also reflect the principle of nonrefoulement. Similar to the 1933 Convention,
however, these agreements were limited and several signatories expressed reservations to the principle." In addition to the limited international agreements, there were five different groups that handled refugee problems. 3 ' Unfortunately, these groups did not work together and succeeded mainly in
creating administrative confusion.3 8 As a result, the obligation of a country not
to expel a refugee was hardly developed during World War I or World War

Treaty law on refugee problems was minimal, 7 and one scholar notes
that the rule of nonrefoulement really did not exist at this time in international law. 38
11.36

Despite its slow acceptance and the qualifications placed on the interna-

tional agreements that contained the principle of nonrefoulement, very few
refugees were returned to their countries of origin during the inter-war period. 9 Although under no legal obligation to do so, the Allied nations pro-

tected the large number of people fleeing political and religious persecution.
This protection laid the foundation for the significant incorporation of
nonrefoulement into international conventions by the United Nations after

World War

11.40

31. Provisional Agreement Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, July 4,
1936, 171 L.N.T.S. 77.
32. Convention Concerning the Status of Refugee!; Coming from Germany, Feb. 10, 1938, 192
L.N.T.S. 61.
H.

33. Only one agreement was ratified, and this was signed by only one state (Belgium). 2
ROHN. WORLD TREATY INDEX 302, 327 (2d ed. 1983).

PETER

34. These groups included: (1) The League of Nations High Commissioner for Russian and
Armenian Refugees (1921-30), subsequently incorporated in the Nansen International Office for
Refugees (1930-38); (2) The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany (1933-35), subsequently incorporated in the League of Nations (1936-46); (3) The League
of Nations High Commissioner for all Refugees (1938-46); (4) The Inter-Governmental Advisory
Commission for Refugees (1929-35); and (5) The Inter-Governmental Committee for Refugees
(1938-47). GRUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NONREFOULEMENT 30 (1989).
35. Id. at 35.
36. Id. at 45.
37. Between 1918 and 1939, only one treaty existed that protected refugees: the Montevideo
Treaty on International Penal Law in Latin America. See id. at 45 n.89 (citing OAS; Treaty
Series No. 34, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/I.l). Article 16 of the Montevideo Treaty provides that "political refugees shall be offered an inviolable asylum" when facing extradition. Id.
38. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 72.
39. Between 1918 and 1939, a large number of refugees fled the Russian Revolution, the Ottoman Empire, the fascist regime in Germany, and the civil war in Spain. These refugees were given
safe haven. For example, France admitted 400,000 refugees from Spain in just ten days in 1939.
Id. at 73.
40. Id. at 71.
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2.

Nonrefoulement in the United Nations International Conventions

a.

1946 to 1951

Since its inception, the United Nations has provided the impetus for the
development of customary rules through its resolutions, its recommendations,
and the activities of its different agencies.41 The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945.42 One of the many purposes of the United Nations was "to achieve international co-operation in solv-

ing international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."4 " The United Nations targeted the growing problem of refugees as
one area in need of international cooperation.""
On February 12, 1946, the United Nations General Assembly decided to

create a special committee, the International Refugee Organization ("IRO")
to solve the refugee problem.'

The IRO incorporated the four previous orga-

nizations that handled refugee problems,"6 and facilitated the resettlement and
integration of over 1,620,000 refugees. 47 This organization had some impact
on most of the Western states, and nonrefoulement was seen as a regional
4
custom during the period immediately after World War II. 8
41. Hyndman, supra note 6, at 266; see also D.H.N. Johnson The Effect of Resolutions of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 97, 97 (1955).
42. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. Most scholars give credit to Franklin Roosevelt for the creative spirit
behind the formation of the United Nations. His famous 1941 Four Freedoms speech envisioned
many precepts that the United Nations sought to achieve. The four freedoms include: (1) freedom
of speech and expression; (2) freedom of every person to worship God in his own way; (3) freedom
from fear; and (4) freedom from want. THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
17-18 (1988); ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 4-5 (1948).
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3.
44. Id.
45. See Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Third Committee, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
1st Sess., pt. 1,G.A. Res. 8, (1946), reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 8 (Dusan J.
Djonovich ed., 1973); Refugees and Displaced Persons, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 1st Sess., pt. 2,
G.A. Res. 62(1), (1948), reprinted in I UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 84, 97 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973).
46. Prior to the creation of IRO, there were four major organizations that dealt with the massive number of refugees and displaced persons after World War II. These organizations included:
(1) The League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which protected persons belonging
to the refugee categories of the inter-war period; (2) Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees
("IGCR"), which gave legal protection and re-emigration assistance to other categories of refugees; (3) the Allied Military Authorities under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Expeditionary Force ("SHAEF"), which until August 1945 had primary responsibility for the liberation,
care, maintenance, repatriation, and resettlement of United Nations displaced persons; and (4) the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ("UNRRA"), which handled questions
relating to the relief and repatriation of displaced persons, including refugees. STENBERG, supra
note 34, at 52.
47. Id. at 54; GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 72.
48. One commentator writes that immediately after World War II, "expulsion and deportation
were very rare." LOUISE W. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 325
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In 1946, the United Nations for the first time officially advocated the principle of nonrefoulement in two documents. The principle is incorporated into the
constitution of the IRO.' 9 In addition, the U.N. General Assembly passed a

resolution on February 12, 1946, stating that "no refugees or displaced persons
. . . shall be compelled to return to their country of origin." 50 The United
Nations again recognized the principle, although indirectly, in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.51 In 1950, the United Nations also
established the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"),
62
which was designed to provide international protection for refugees.
b.

1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees

The most comprehensive and binding document for refugee problems was
drafted in 1951. 53 The 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees ("1951 Convention") provides protection to refugees by "matching specific state rights with corresponding state obligations.

'5 4

The General Assem-

bly apparently thought it wise to "revise and consolidate previous international
(1956). Similarly, Weis notes that refoulement was rare, except for the case of "some Russians
and Ukrainians covered by certain wartime agreements." Paul Weis, The InternationalProtection
of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 196 (1954). But see GOODWIN-GILL supra note 17, at 72
(maintaining that state practice "is regrettably inconclusive" during this period).
49. The IRO Constitution provides that a person who comes within the ambit of the IRO
should not be repatriated to a country if he has "valid objections." These objections include "persecution, or fear based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality
or political opinions, provided these opinions are not in conflict with the principles of the United
Nations, as laid down in the Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations." STENBERG, supra
note 34, at 56 (citing IRO CONST., Annex I, Part I, § C (1)(a) (1946)).
50. See Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the Third Committee, supra note 45, at 8; see
also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 71 (discussing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights).
51. The Declaration does not directly provide for nonrefoulement. However, Article 3 ("the
right to life, liberty and security of person"), Article 13 ("the right to . . . residence within the
borders of a state . . . [and] the right to leave any country"), Article 14 ("the right to seek and to
enjoy . . . asylum from persecution"), and Article 15 ("the right to a nationality" and the freedom fiom the denial of the "right to change his nationality"), when viewed together, reflect the
basic principle of nonrefoulement. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(I11)
(1948), reprinted in 2 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, supra note 45, at 135, 136-38; see also
Joseph F. Riga, Note, Defenses for the Sanctuary Movement: A Humanitarian Plea Falling upon
Deaf Ears, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 225, 232 (1989) (discussing the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights).
52. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res.
428(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 20, at 46-47, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). UNHCR has been a
vigorous advocate of nonrefoulement since its inception.
53. United Nations Convention Relating to the :Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. The Convention went into force on April 22, 1954. This
document, along with the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, are often referred to
as the "Magna Carta for Refugees." See Hyndman, supra note 6, at 233.
54. See Scott M. Martin, Non-Refoulement of Refugees: United States Compliance with International Obligations, 7 IMMIGR. & NATIONALITY L. REV. 650, 653 (1982) (originally published at

1982

HARV. INT'L

L.J. 357).
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agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and
the protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement."5 5
The drafters of the 1951 Convention sought to guarantee the refugees "fundamental rights and freedoms." 56 The General Assembly accomplished this goal
by expressly incorporating the right to nonrefoulement in the 1951
Convention.5"
The 1951 Convention's definition of refugee is a vital threshold question
concerning its applicability. Only those people falling under its scope are entitled to nonrefoulement. The 1951 Convention defines a refugee as anyone who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
8
it.5

The 1951 Convention further limits its scope to individuals who became refugees due to events occurring in Europe prior to January 1, 1951.5 While the
1951 Convention was well suited to handle World War II refugees, it did
nothing to assist Asian, African, or Latin American refugees.60 Despite its
limited scope, the 1951 Convention was an improvement over the prewar conventions, and afforded more protection to refugees through its nonrefoulement
provisions.
The two main provisions within the 1951 Convention that guarantee the
principle of nonrefoulement are Articles 32 and 33. These two articles concern the power of the member states to expel refugees. Article 32 provides
that "the Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order." 2 Expulsion based
on grounds of public order or national security may only result from a decision
55. 1951 Convention, supra note 53, pmbl.
56. Id.

57. Id. art. 33(l) ("[Nbo contracting state shall expel or return certain refoulers to a territory
where his life or freedom may be threatened.").
58. Id. arts. l(A)(2), 33(1). Note that this definition does not include victims of general violence (the refugees must be under individual attack), nor does it include economic refugees (individuals seeking better lifestyles) or displaced persons (individuals who are homeless but who have
not left their countries' borders).
59. Id. The 1951 Convention allowed states to define "events occurring before January 1,
1951" in two ways; one limited "events" only to those occurring in Europe, while the other did not
contain geographical limitations. Id. The Convention requested each contracting party to specify
which way it would define "events" at the time of ratification. See id. art. I(B); see also Martin,
supra note 54, at 654 (noting this limitation).
60. This was due to the geographical and time limitations of the 1951 Convention. See Martin,
supra note 54, at 654.
61. 1951 Convention, supra note 53, arts. 32, 33.
62. Id. art. 32(1).
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reached in accordance with due process of law.63
Article 33 provides that "no Contracting States shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.""' A
crucial aspect of Article 33 is that each state may not make reservations of
any kind, but rather must agree to the terms as written.6" Thus, Article 33
obligates all contracting states to "unconditionally" observe its nonrefoulement
clause. 6
However, Article 33 does not protect those refugees whom the state reasonably regards as a "danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country." 67 Nor does this article
protect refugees who (a) have committed crimes against peace, crimes against
humanity, or war crimes; (b) have committed serious nonpolitical crimes; or
(c) have acted in a manner contrary to the principles and policies of the
United Nations. 68 Nevertheless, these limits do not detract from the obligatory
nature of nonrefoulement.
The 1951 Convention greatly expanded the concept of nonrefoulement well
beyond the qualifications and reservations imposed in earlier times. Contracting states could neither directly nor indirectly force refugees to return to
countries where the refugees reasonably could face persecution, unless the refugees constituted a threat to "national security" or to "the community." 6 To
date, ninety-five countries are signatories to the 1951 Convention. Other nations, like the United States, became signatories to the 1951 Convention indirectly by signing the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.7 1 The
1951 Convention continues to provide substantial protection for refugees and
72
is the basis upon which current refugee law has developed.
63. Id. art. 32(2).
64. Id. art. 33(l).
65. Article 42(l) provides that "at the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State
may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1,3, 4, 16(l), 33, 36-46
inclusive." Id. art. 42(l) (emphasis added). Article I contains the definition of the term "refugee"; article 3 is a non-discrimination clause; article 16(1) provides for free access to the courts of
all contracting countries; and articles 36-46 are administrative clauses. Id. arts. 1,3, 4, 16(l), 3646. Thus, Article 33 is the only substantive provision that allows no exceptions by contracting
states.
66. See Martin, supra note 54, at 654.
67. 1951 Convention, supra note 53, art. 33(2).
68. Id. art. l(F)(a)-(c).
69. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (discussing the three exceptions to
nonrefoulement in the 1951 Convention).
70. See 3 ROHN, supra note 33, at 635-36.
71. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S.
268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; see infra note 79 (noting that ninety-five countries, including the
United States, have become signatories to the 1967 Protocol).
72. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 13.
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1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

Several years after the ratification of the 1951 Convention, the United Nations General Assembly recognized that there were problems with the limitations the Convention had placed on refugees. While the number of refugees
around the world increased with each new political upheaval, the number of
refugees protected by the 1951 Convention decreased. This decrease was due
to the requirement that the individuals seeking refuge be refugees due to
events occurring in Europe prior to January 1, 1951.
In an effort to widen the scope of protection under nonrefoulement, the
General Assembly eliminated the time and geographical limitations placed on
refugees under the 1951 Convention. 73 It broadened the scope of the 1951
Convention to include all the individuals who had become refugees due to incidents that occurred after January 1, 1951, and abandoned the European location requirement."" Therefore, the 1967 Protocol now applies to almost every
7 v
refugee.
Like the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol also obliges Contracting States
to adhere to the principle of nonrefoulement. 7' Article 7(1) of the 1967 Protocol does not allow states to reserve any rights under Article 33 of the 1951
Convention.77 "The presence of this limitation indicates that, sixteen years after the drafting of the Convention, the principle of non-refoulement remained
of such importance as to allow no conditional or alternative provisions. ' 78
Thus, the right of nonrefoulement was permanently entrenched in interna79
tional law.
d.

Other international conventions

In addition to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, there are a number of other international documents that reflect the principle of nonrefoulement. These documents are both regional and international, and contain varying definitions of "refugee." The first is the 1967 Declaration on Territorial
Asylum.80 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the resolution that
"[n]o person . . . shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the fron73. 1967 Protocol, supra note 71, art. 1(2), (3).
74. Id.
75. Note that while the time and geographical limitations are gone, the 1967 Protocol did not
expand the 1951 Convention's definition of refugee. Thus, refugees of general violence, economic
refugees, and displaced persons still do not fall within the scope of the term "refugee." See supra
text accompanying notes 58-59 (discussing the definition of refugee under the 1951 Convention).
76. 1967 Protocol, supra note 71, art. VII(l). Article 1(3) does provide that any reservations
made by a State under the 1951 Convention shall apply to the 1967 Protocol. Id. art. 1(3).
77. Id. art. VII(l).
78. Martin, supra note 54, at 655.
79. As of 1990, ninety-five states have become signatories to the 1967 Protocol, including the
United States. 4 ROHN, supra note 33, at 1394-95.
80. See Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 Territorial Declaration].

DEPAUL LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 41:927

tier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any State where he may be subjected to persecu-

tion." 81 In the same year, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe ratified a document providing that states should "ensure that no one
shall be subjected to refusal of admission at the frontier which would have the
result of compelling him to return to, or remain in, a territory where he would

be in danger of persecution .

".8..2

The Committee used the same definition

of refugee as the 1951 Convention.

In 1969, the Organization of African Unity ("OAU") created a document
that espouses one of the most comprehensive applications of the principle of
nonrefoulement. 83 The OAU Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa, a
regional convention open to African states only, protects refugees through Article 11(3), which states that "no person shall be subjected by a Member State
to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would
compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened .

.

.

"

The phrase "physical integrity"

expands the nonrefoulement provision of the 1967 Protocol as applied by the
OAU.8 5
Another regional document that broadened nonrefoulement is the 1969

American Convention on Human Rights.8'" This convention includes all North,
Central, and South American states. Article 22(8) of the 1969 American Convention states:
[I]n no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless
81. Id. art. 3(1). This Declaration used the same definition of refugee as the 1951 and 1967
United Nations conventions concerning refugees. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (discussing the 1951 Convention definition of a refugee).
82. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 76 (citing G.A. Res. (67) 14 on Asylum to Persons
in Danger of Persecution, adopted June 29, 1967).
83. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, concluded, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter 1969.OAU Convention].
84. Id. art. 1(2).
)
85. In addition to the usual definition of the term "refugee," Article 1(2) of the 1969 OAU
Convention also includes:
[E]very person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either part of the whole of his country of
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to
seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
Id. The contracting states agree to administer the provisions of the OAU Convention without
regard to race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political views. Id. art. IV.
86. 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Official Recs. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.I,
doc. 65, rev. 1, corr. 2, (Jan. 2, 1970), reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 176, 186 (1985) [hereinafter 1969 American Convention]. Although
President Carter gave the 1969 Convention to the Senate for ratification on February 23, 1978,
the Senate has not yet acted upon it. See President Carter, Letter of Transmittal for American
Convention on Human Rights (Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN

RIGHTS TREATIES 85, at 85 (Robert Lillich ed., 1981) (noting to the Senate that the American
Convention on Human Rights was adopted by the Organization of American States in 1969);
Martin, supra note 54, at 655-56.
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of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life
or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social status or political opinion.87

In contrast to Article 33 of the 1951 Convention, which allowed states to return people who constitute risks to national security or danger to the community,88 Article 22 recognizes absolutely no reservations or exceptions to its provision.89 Under Article 22, nonrefoulement applies to all persons legally or
illegally within the borders of a party state. 90
Finally, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also
reflects the principle of nonrefoulement. 9' Although this United Nations document does not expressly prohibit refoulement, it does recognize the international rights of a refugee facing expulsion.92 These international and regional
documents demonstrate the extensive growth of the principle of nonrefoule-

ment since World War II.
B.

The History of Nonrefoulement as State Practice

In addition to the many international conventions that promulgate
nonrefoulement, state practice over the twentieth century lends support to the

notion that this principle is an established custom of international law. While
the term "nonrefoulement" is usually not expressly stated, the municipal laws
of most states contain language that parallels that found in Article 33 of the
1951 Convention. 3 Cases of nonrefoulement usually are reflected in individual
87. 1969 American Convention, supra note 86, art. 22(8).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (discussing the two exceptions to nonrefoulement
in the 1951 Convention).
89. 1969 American Convention, supra note 86, art. 22.
90. Id. art. 22(1).
91. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, Dec. 16, 1966,
reprinted in DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE app. 1. (Ian Brownlie ed.,

1991) [hereinafter 1966 Convenant].
92. The 1966 Covenant protects the refugee's due process rights under Article 13, which states:
[A]n alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Convenant may be
expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law
and shall . . . be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his
case reviewed by . . . the competent authority.
1966 Covenant, supra note 91, art. 13.
For other examples of regional documents that reflect nonrefoulement, see the 1954 Caracas
Convention on Territorial Asylum, Mar. 28, 1954, 18 Pan-Am. T.S. No. 34, OAS Off. Rec.,
OEA/ser. X/1 (text in English). Article 3 provides that "no State is under the obligation . . . to
expel from its own territory, persons persecuted for political reasons or offenses." Id. art. 3; The
European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, Sept. 3, 1953, reprinted in COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS § 1, Doc. I (7th ed.
Strasbourg 1971). Article 2(2) provides that "no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the
territory of the States." Id. art. 2(2).
93. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988); GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 162-204 (analyzing the domestic law enactment of nonrefoulement in over twenty countries); Kay Hailbronner,
Non-refoulement and "Humanitarian"Refugees: Customary InternationalLaw or Wishful Legal
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adjudications in immigration courts around the world. Refugees may be protected indirectly ("for example, where deportation tribunals are empowered to
take all relevant factors into account" 94 ), or directly, by an express limitation
on the permissible grounds for expulsion and choice of destination.9"
The United States, for example, incorporates the principle of nonrefoulement in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). 91 This statute provides:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien

. . .

to a coun-

try if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom
would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.0,

This provision includes the same five bases of persecution as Article 33 of the
1951 Convention. 98 Several United States Supreme Court decisions have interpreted section 243(h) of the 1980 Immigration and Nationality Act as incorporating the principle of nonrefoulement. In INS v. Stevic, 99 the Court noted
that "section 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980 amended the language of
§ 243(h) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act], basically conforming it to
the language of Article 33 .

. . ."'0

In INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, the Court

stated that § 243(h) "fulfills the nonrefoulement requirements of article
33.,1"0
Customary international law requires both consistency of state practice and
a belief by the observing state that the practice is obligatory, or opinio
juris.1°1 While it is more difficult to establish that states practice nonrefoulement out of a sense of legal obligation, opinio juris is reflected (a) in express
official statements, (b) in the consistency of state practice, and (c) from protests by other states against breaches of the norm.103 The above-mentioned
international and regional conventions, as well as domestic law, all embody the
principle of nonrefoulement. Further, the overwhelming majority of states consistently have embraced this concept. Finally, many scholars regard
Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857, 880-87 (1986) (analyzing domestic law enactment of
nonrefoulement in ten countries).
94. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 137 n.50.
95. Deborah Perluss & Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary
Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 576-77 (1986).
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying note 58 (describing the five bases of persecution found in the
1951 Convention).
99. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
100. Id. at 424; see also Matter of Dunar, 14 1. & N. Dec. 310, 320 (1973) ("Section 243(h)
was brought into harmony with Article 33.").
101. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 n.25 (1986) ("The 1980 Act made withholding of deportation under § 243(h) mandatory in order to comply with Article 33.1.").
102. See supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing the two components of customary international law).
103. See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 95, at 577-78.
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nonrefoulement as a customary norm. 10 ' Thus, both elements needed to establish nonrefoulement as an customary international norm have been satisfied.
Some scholars contend that a new international norm has grown out of
nonrefoulement.' 0 5 This norm, the right to temporary refuge, prohibits the deportation"0 6 of refugees to their country of origin. The right to temporary refuge is similar to nonrefoulement, as it prohibits a state from returning refugees to a country where the refugees may face persecution. The main
difference is its scope-the norm protects refugees who do not fall under the
individualized protection of the 1951 and the 1967 United Nations refugee
documents. In other words, the right to temporary refuge covers those refugees
who are the victims of general violence and persecution.107
Temporary refuge embodies the concept that aliens should not be returned
to a country that is engaged in internal strife until the violence ceases and
normal conditions resume. 0 8 This norm "prohibits a state from forcibly repatriating foreign nationals who find themselves in its territory after having fled
generalized violence .. .caused by internal armed conflict within their own
state." 0 9 A refuge state must provide safe haven until the "state can assure
the security and protection of its nationals."' 10
The right to temporary refuge enjoys growing legal and judicial support.
Recently, a United States court extended the principle of nonrefoulement by
refusing to return three Salvadoran refugees back to El Salvador until the civil
war had ceased."' The fact that another norm has grown out of the principle
104. The following is a list of scholars who agree with this principle: GOODWIN-GILL, supra
note 17; Hyndman, supra note 6; Martin, supra note 54; Karen Parker, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 675, 679 (1985); Perluss & Hartman, supra note 95; Peter
Weis, United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 1969 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 92, 148
(1969); Riga, supra note 51. For the opposing view, see 2 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-98 (1974); S. PRAKASH SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 280 (1969).
105. See Guy Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT'L
L.897, 914 (1986); Parker, supra note 104, at 679; Perluss & Hartman, supra note 95, at 600.
But see Hailbronner, supra note 93, at 858 (arguing that nonrefoulement is not an international
norm, because states fear losing control of their borders).
106. Deportation is a method by which a country returns an individual to his country of origin
if that individual does not meet the criteria for legal entry into the country. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §
1252 (1988).
107. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 105, at 901-02.
108. See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 95, at 558-71 (listing countries that have provided the
right of temporary refuge to refugees).
109. Id. at 554.
110. Id.
11l.
In re Santos, No. A29-564-781 (Aug. 24, 1990) (Nejelski, l.J.), summarized in 67 INTERPRETOR RELEASES 982 (1990). The Santos case represents a breakthrough for immigration defense attorneys who have advocated the right of temporary refuge without great success. Judge
Nejelski is the first immigration judge to acknowledge the right of temporary refuge. "This court
finds a right to non-return to a country engaged in civil war, which is recognized in international
state practice and opinio juris.
Id., slip op. at 10. Other immigration judges mask this
concept under the guise of extended voluntary departure. See Parker, supra note 104, at 680
("The concept of nonrefoulement is articulated in United States Law as extended voluntary de-
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of nonrefoulement bolsters the argument that it is a well-established custom-

ary international norm. Some scholars contend that the customary international norm of nonrefoulement is now a peremptory right.112
In addition, the United Nations ligh Commissioner for Refugees
("UNHCR") recently stated that there exists "a universally recognized principle of non-refoulement, which requires that no person shall be subjected to
such measures as rejection at the frontier . . . expulsion or compulsory return

to any country where he may have reason to fear persecution or serious danger
from unsettled conditions or civil strife.' 1 3
While nonrefoulement protects most refugees, there are express limits on
the scope of its protection. Even if the refugee may face persecution in a country, the refugee may be returned to that country if the refugee falls under one
1
of the express exceptions to nonrefoulement. 1
C.

Exceptions to the Principle of Nonrefoulement

Like so many other concepts of international law, nonrefoulement is not an
absolute principle."' States have long justified the derogation of the principle
with the excuse of "public order" or "national security.' 1 6 The more deeply
embedded the principle becomes in international law, however, the more difficult it is for states to invoke exceptions." 7
The 1951 Convention expressly excludes refugees from the protection of
nonrefoulement whom the state reasonably regards as "a danger to the security of the country" or "a danger to the community of that country."" 8 State
parture. In my view, extended voluntary departure is just another way of saying nonrefouleinent.").
112. See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 95, at (00 ("[T]he prohibition on compulsory return
as a principal should be observed as a rule of jus cogens.").
The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States explains peremptory
norms:
Some rules of international law are recognized by the international community of
states as peremptory, permitting no derogation. These rules prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international law in conflict with
them. Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm
of international law having the same character. It is generally accepted that the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force . . . have the character of jus cogens.
RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES §

102 cmt. k

(1986). A peremptory norm in international law is one that cannot be broken by any treaty,
domestic or international law. Id.
113. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 153, U.N. Doc. E/
1985/62 (1985).

114. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (describing the limits on the protection of
nonrefoulement in the 1951 Convention).
115. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 95.

116. Id.; see, e.g.. the exceptions in the 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of
Refugees (noted supra text accompanying note 29).
117. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 95.

118. 1951 Convention, supra note 53, art. 33(2).
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authorities determine who constitutes a danger by reviewing the individual's
activities to assess potential security risks. 19 In addition, the 1951 Convention
does not give protection to any refugee who has committed a crime against
peace or humanity, a war crime, or a serious nonpolitical crime, or has acted
in a manner inconsistent with general United Nations principles and
policies.

120

Other international conventions also create exceptions to nonrefoulement. A
stronger exception appears in the 1967 U.N. Declaration on Territorial Asylum."' In addition to a national security exception, Article 3 of this declaration authorizes further exceptions "in order to safeguard the population, as in
the case of a mass influx of persons."' 2 2 As mass influxes of people usually
occur with temporary refuge and not nonrefoulement, most commentators criticize this strong exception as vague and urge states not to invoke the
provision.' 23
Unlike the conventions cited above, the 1969 OAU Convention states that
the principle of nonrefoulement is without exception.124 Similarly, the 1969
to diminish the
American Convention does not permit a contracting state
25
provisions.
nonrefoulement
its
under
protection
scope of
While the 1951 Convention includes four limitations to the concept of
nonrefoulement, various states have developed municipal laws that expand the
exceptions to nonrefoulement. For example, the United States places six limitations on this principle in the 1980 Refugee Act. 26 These include when:
[a] the refugee is not a refugee within the meaning of the refugee Act of

1980;127

119. One representative to the 1951 Convention stated that state authorities should interpret
"reasonable grounds" on the basis of whether the danger likely to be encountered by the refugee
upon refoulement was greater than the threat to the community. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note

17, at 96 n.118 (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.16, at 8).
120. 1951 Convention, supra note 53, art. I(F)(a)-(c); see also supra text accompanying note
68 (discussing these limitations).
121. 1967 U.N. Territorial Declaration, supra note 80, art. 3.
122. Id.
123. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 97. Goodwin-Gill maintains that states should examine
the likelihood of international response in terms of financial and medical assistance as a factor to
be set against any potential threat to security. Id.
124. 1969 OAU Convention, supra note 83, art. II.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90 (describing the 1969 American Convention).
126. Asylum Procedures, 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f) (1988).
127. The 1980 Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § I101(a) (1980), defined "refugee" as:
[Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion .

. .

. The term 'refugee' does not include any person who

ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on
account of race, nationality, religion, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Id.[author's note]
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[b] the refugee has been firmly resettled in a foreign country;
[c]the refugee ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, member2
ship in a particular group, or political opinion; '
[d] the refugee was convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious
crime, and constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
[e] the United States has serious reasons for considering that the alien
has committed a serious non-political crime outside the United States; and
[f] the United States has reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to its national security. *9

The United States limitations on the availability of nonrefoulement are stricter
than the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum.
Another means by which states try to avoid the application of nonrefoulement is through extradition treaties. While a state may grant asylum to protect a refugee, it also may have a duty to return a refugee to a requesting
country. These two principles create tension among nations and confusion over
which obligation, extradition or nonrefoulement, carries greater weight.130
D. Extradition Procedures
Extradition is the converse of asylum. Current extradition practice is "a formal process by which a person is surrendered by one state to another based on
a treaty ... ."I Like asylum, extradition is an old concept, originating in

early non-Western civilizations.1 -2 As the Doherty case concerns the extradition treaties between the United States and the United Kingdom, this analysis
will be confined to the treaties between these two countries.

128. At least one court has held that attacks by guerrillas on police and military are not acts of
persecution. See In re Fuentes-Sanchez, 19 1. & N. Dec. 658 (1988); see also In re RodriguezMajano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (1988) ("We do not believe Congress intended to restrict
asylum and withholding of deportation only to those who have taken no part in armed conflict.").
[author's note]
129. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8 (1988).

130. Charles L. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exception in International Extradition: A
Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV.
777, 806 (1977).
131. 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 8 (1987). Both the United States and the United Kingdom require that a treaty be in force
before extradition will be granted. Id. at 10.
In general, most extradition treaties require that three procedural elements are met prior to
extradition: (a) the offender must be within the jurisdiction of the requesting state; (b) the state
intending to prosecute or punish a fugitive must make a formal request; and (c) the offense must

have been committed in the jurisdiction of the requesting state. SATYA D. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 19 (1968). The extradition process in the United States is
the exclusive prerogative of the federal government. See I BASSIOUNI, supra, at 711.
132. I BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 5. The first extradition treaty dates back to ancient
Egypt, 1280 B.C. I id. at 6;IVAN A. SHEARER, ]EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971).
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1. General Extradition Process
The United States requires that an extradition treaty be in force between
the requesting and asylum states before extradition will be granted. 13 3 The
authority to enter into extradition treaties rests solely with the executive
branch pursuant to the United States Constitution.'3 However, such treaties
must be submitted to the Senate for ratification. 3 5
In general, the United States extradition process works as follows. The requesting state petitions the Attorney General to file a complaint in a federal
district court.13 6 The Attorney General seeks a warrant for the fugitive's aruntil his
rest, which is usually granted. The fugitive is arrested and detained
1 37
extradition hearing before a United States district court judge.
At the hearing, a United States district court judge examines whether the
necessary procedural and substantive elements of extradition have been met. 38
The purpose of the extradition hearing is not to assess the guilt or innocence of
the fugitive. Rather, it is an "inquiry into whether there is competent evidence
to justify holding the accused."'1 39 The judge must determine "whether there is
that an offense has been committed and that the
probable cause to believe
40
accused committed it.'
At the extradition hearing, the fugitive may introduce evidence that demonstrates that his case falls within a prohibition to extradition under the extradition treaty (such as the political offense exception), but he may not introduce
evidence on the merits of his case.' 4 ' The judge then determines whether or
not to extradite the fugitive.' 2
Federal courts should interpret extradition treaties in "accordance with applicable Constitutional provisions.' M43 Extradition treaties are incorporated
into federal law, and are of equal weight as federal legislation. 44 Courts
should interpret the two to avoid conflicts and inconsistencies. 4
If a court finds that extradition would violate a fugitive's constitutional
rights, the executive branch may not extradite him. 46 Extradition decisions
133. See 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 10.
cl.2; 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 39.
134. See U.S. CONST. art. 11,
135. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 39.

See 2 id. at 512-13.
2 id.
2 id.
2 id. at 562.
In re McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 523-24 (1974)).
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

141. Id. at 1292.
142. See 2 BASSlOUNI, supra note 131, at 577.
143. McMullen, 769 F. Supp. at 1293 (citing Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 514 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981)).

144. Id. (citing Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902)).
145. Id. (citing I BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE ch. II, § 4-7); see supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
United States statutory construction and international law).
146. McMullen, 769 F. Supp. at 1294 (citing Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 184 (1902)); see
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are not appealable, as they are not final decisions. 4" Thus, the recourse of an
unsatisfied fugitive is to bring a habeas corpus proceeding in a United States
district court. The recourse of an unsatisfied requesting state is to refile the
1

request.

8

2. History of Extradition Between the United States and the United
Kingdom

A brief history of the extradition treaties between the United States and the
United Kingdom reveals that the early treaties primarily concerned trade, navigation, and boundaries, 1 9 and contained very few limitations to extradition.180
Later treaties between the United States and the United Kingdom include the

Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842,151 the Dawes-Simon Extradition Treaty of
1931,52 and the 1972 Extradition Treaty.153 The 1972 Extradition Treaty was
also In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1485 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]hen the conduct of the United States
government is challenged, such conduct must be assessed in light of the Constitution."); Plaster v.
United States, 720 F.2d 340, 348 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); In re Extradition of Atta, 1988 WL
66866 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988) (unreported slip op.) (holding that constitutional rights in extradition take precedence over treaty terms).
147. McMullen. 769 F. Supp. at 1288 n.12 (citing Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 988 (1976)).
148. Id. (citing In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981)). United States courts have
held that refiling an extradition request is not a Fifth Amendment double-jeopardy violation. See
Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 430 (1923).
149. See SHEARER, supra note 132, at 13 (citing I WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATISES. CONVENTIONS. INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF

590 (1910)).
150. One provision regarding the extradition of fugitives is located in Article 27 of Jays Treaty
of 1794, which provides:
[lit is further agreed that His Majesty and. the United States on mutual requisitions,
by them respectively, or by their respective Ministers or officers authorized to make
the same, will deliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with murder or
forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either, shall seek an asylum within any
of the countries of the other, provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of
criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so
charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial, if
the offense had been there committed.
SHEARER, supra note 132, at 13 (citing Jays Treaty of 1794, art. 27).
While many of the modern elements of extradition are reflected in Article 27, many others are
absent; namely, the exception for political offense, the principle of specialty, the rule against
double jeopardy and the wide range of offenses applicable to the extradition. See id. Note that the
only two crimes listed are murder and forgery.
151. See Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, in SHEARER, supra note 132, at 14 (citing I WILAMERICA AND OTHER POWERS

LIAM M.

MALLOY, TREATISES, CONVENTIONS,

INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREE-

MENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS

152.

47

Stat. 2122, T.I.A.S. No. 849; 9

650 (1910)).

WILLIAM M. MALLOY, TREATISES, CONVENTIONS, IN-

TERNATIONAL ACTS. PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

4274-79 (1910)).
153. Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 229 [hereinafter 1972 Extradition Treaty]. See generally T.E. Molner, Recent Development, Extradition: Limitation of the
Political Offense Exception, 27 HARV. INT'L L..l. 266 (1986) (describing the differences between
AND OTHER POWERS
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in force at the time of Doherty's trial. Most of its provisions remain in force
today.
3.

5"

The Political Offense Exception

The political offense exception is one of the many restrictive principles in
the extradition process. These restrictions serve as substantive limits on the

extradition of fugitives. 55 Along with the political offense exception, other
grounds which justify a refusal of extradition include: "the legality of the offense charged, double jeopardy, statute of limitations, speedy trial, amnesty,
and trial in absentia."' 6 The political offense exception is one of the most

traditional restrictions on extradition. The political offense exception bars the
extradition of a fugitive if his "crime" was politically motivated.1 5 As Doherty enlisted the political offense exception, this Note will focus on this exception alone.

The political offense exception is based upon three different rationales. The
first rationale is rooted in altruistic humanitarian concerns relating to the

treatment to which the fugitive would be subjected upon his return.' 58 The

second justification stems from the commitment and desire of the asylum state

to protect bona fide values of individual freedom.1 59 The final justification is
the 1972 Extradition Treaty and the Supplementary Treaty). The United Kingdom requested that
Doherty be extradited under the 1972 Extradition Treaty. See infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text (describing the district court's analysis of the 1972 Extradition Treaty as applied.to
Doherty).
154. The current treaty between these two nations is the Supplementary Extradition Treaty of
1985. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1105 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. The Supplementary Treaty alters the language of the 1972 Extradition Treaty in one main area-the
political offense exception.
155. When a fugitive is not returned to the requesting country, it is termed "nonextradition."
STENBERG,

supra note 34, at 179.

156. See I BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 381.
157. See l id. at 371; Edward M. Wise, Terrorism and the Problems of an InternationalCriminal Law, 19 CONN. L. REv. 799, 824-25 (1987); see also Lora L. Deere, Political Offenses in the
Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1933) (analyzing the political offense
exception in European and U.S. extradition treaties).
Bassiouni advocates that fugitives should not be sheltered by the political offense exception if
they committed international crimes. I BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 436-45. International offenses include: (i) aggression as defined by the United Nations Charter; (ii) crimes against humanity; (iii) war crimes; (iv) piracy; (v) hijacking; (vi) slavery, white slavery and other forms of
traffic of women and children; (vii) counterfeiting; (viii) the kidnapping of internationally protected persons; (ix) international traffic in narcotics; and (x) racial discrimination. I Id. at 443-44.
158. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAUL L.
REV. 217, 232 (1970); Cantrell, supra note 130, at 782; Deere, supra note 157, at 249.
159. See Nicholas N. Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists: Reconciling Human Rights with World
Order, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 291, 292-93 (1981); M. G. Kaladharan Nayar, The Right of
Asylum in International Law: Its Status and Prospectus, 17 ST. Louis U. L.J. 17, 32 (1972).
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the assumption that political offenses do not violate international world or-

der.160 Thus, states do not share a mutual interest in suppressing political

crimes. Political offenses usually are local in character and are directed at the
domestic state, and therefore do not warrant international suppression.1 ' All
three justifications provide humanitarian protection for the fugitive, and seek
to ensure that the rights of a refugee or fugitive receive adequate protection." 2

Many scholars agree that the principle of nonrefoulement is incorporated
into the political offense exception. 63 Both serve to prohibit the return of a
person to a country where the person may face political persecution. Most
perpetrators of political crimes would be persecuted on account of their politi-

cal opinion. Most scholars maintain that where no extradition treaty exists
between the asylum country and the requesting country, the asylum country
must abide by the principle of nonrefoulement,

e4

due to the fact that a treaty

must exist between the two states prior to extradition. Opinion is split, however, where an extradition treaty exists. A minority of scholars contends that
where an extradition treaty exists, the obligation to extradite takes precedence
over the obligation of nonrefoulement." 65 By contrast, a majority of scholars
supports the view that a state's duty to practice nonrefoulement takes precedence over a state's duty to extradite a fugitive under an extradition treaty.'

These scholars maintain that abiding by the extradition obligation may be
contrary to the principle of nonrefoulement, and that the creation and ratification of the treaty itself may constitute a violation of Article 33, and thus vio160. See CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIINGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADI29-32 (1980); Dinah L. Shelton, The Relationship of International Human Rights Law and
Humanitarian Law to the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (Ellen L. Lutzand & Kathryn J. Burke eds., 1989).
The notion that political offenses do not violate international world order stems from the "glorification of revolutionary heroes" of the nineteenth century. WIJNGAERT, supra, at 29. "It was
assumed that political offenders were morally superior to common offenders because they fought
for a better legal order and because they did not act from personal motives but in the interests of
society as a whole." Id.
161. See Shelton, supra note 160, at 151.
162. In fact, the effect of the political offense exception is comparable to asylum. See Arthur C.
Helton, Harmonizing Political Asylum and International Extradition: Avoiding Analytical
Cacophony. I GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 457, 458 (1986) ("The political offense exception . . . has a
humanitarian function, and its effect is comparable to a right of asylum.").
163. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 17, at 120; WIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 65; Nayar,
supra note 159, at 32.
TION

164. STENBERG, supra note 34, at 179.
165. Id.
166. See ALONA E. EVANS & JOHN F. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 497 (1979); STENBERG, supra note 34, at 179; WIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 77; A.M.
Connelly, Non-Extradition for Political Offenses: A Matter of Legal Obligation or Simply a
Policy Choice?, 1982 IRISH JURIST 59, 67; Nayar, supra note 159, at 65; Shelton, supra note 160,
at 157; Weis, supra note 104, at 143.
Wijngaert states, "The fact that the person ... committed crimes, however serious, should not
result inthe denial of the protection of nonrefoulement . . . .The humanitarian character of the
norm istoo absolute and should . . . not warrant any exception whatsoever." WIJNGAERT, supra
note 160, at 77.
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late international law. 167 Therefore, the majority approach would apply
nonrefoulement over the duty to extradite.168 As one scholar notes, "No general municipal provision exists which would prohibit the nonextradition of a
refugee to a country of persecution." '69 Further, proponents of this approach
wording of Article 33 supports the stronger obligation
argue that the general
70
of nonrefoulement.1
The majority approach enjoys the additional support of the United Nations
High Commissioner of Refugees.17 1 The UNCHR "has for a long time .. .
taken the view that Article 33 of the 1951 Convention may be interpreted to
include a prohibition against extradition of a refugee to a country of persecution."1 72 This support, along with state practice of including the political offense exception into extradition treaties, demonstrates that Article 33 "includes a prohibition against extraditing a refugee to a country of
persecution.' 73 Thus, the political offense exception embodies the duty of
nonrefoulement.
a.

1972 Extradition Treaty's political offense exception

Doherty thwarted the United Kingdom's attempt to extradite him under the
1972 Extradition Treaty by using the political offense exception. This clause
provides:
Extradition shall not be granted if

. .

.the offense for which extradition

is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political character

. . .

or the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has

in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a
political character ....

174

This definition is similar to the political offense exceptions in the majority of
79
current extradition treaties between the United States and other countries.
b.

1985 Supplementary Treaty political offense exception

In stark contrast, the 1985 Supplementary Extradition Treaty currently in
force between the United States and the United Kingdom completely eviscer167. STENBERG, supra note 34, at 179.
168. Id. Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty places the duty to examine possible persecution to the refugee upon return over the duty to extradite. See Supplementary Treaty art. 3(a), in
132 CONG. REC. 16,558 (1986).
169. See STENBERG, supra note 34, at 198.
170. Id. at 178.
171. Id. at 140.
172. Id. at 202.
173. Id.
174. 1972 Extradition Treaty, supra note 153, art. V.
175. See I BASSIOUNi, supra note 131, ch. I (outlining the general extradition treaties between
the United States and European countries). For a description of how the district court applied this
exception to Doherty, see infra notes 294-302 and accompanying text.
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ates the political offense exception."" 6 While it retains the political offense exception in principle, the treaty bars so many offenses from its scope that the
exception is rendered meaningless. A person committing any of the following
offenses are subject to extradition:
[a] an offense for which both Contracting parties have the obligation to a
multinational international agreement 177 to extradite the person sought or to
submit his case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution;
[b] murder, manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm;
[c] kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or serious unlawful detention, including the taking of a hostage;
[d] an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade rocket, firearm, letter
or parcel bomb, or an incendiary device, which is likely to endanger life or
cause serious damage to property; and
[e] an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participate as
an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an
offense. 17 8
Very few crimes fall outside the scope of this list. Thus, scholars have criticized the Supplementary Treaty, stating that Article I "curtails the availability of the political offense exception to an unprecedented degree in interna1 79
tional law.'
Many critics and opponents fought hard to keep the exclusion list out of the
treaty. Congress held lengthy debates that mainly centered on the severe curtailment of the political offense exception and the alleged purpose behind the
treaty. 8 The Reagan Administration billed the Supplementary Treaty as a
vital tool needed for the effective combat of international terrorism. The executive branch stated that the new treaty represented "a significant step in im176. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 154., art. I. For a critical view of the Supplementary Treaty, see Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to
Extradition, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 148 (1986) (arguing that the approval of the
Supplementary Treaty "was a mistake"); John P. Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion
of the Political Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1515 (1988) (criticizing the double standard and retroac-

tive nature of the new treaty).
177. There are four relevant multinational international agreements to date: International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974
U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16. 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. These incorporate provision I(F) of the 1951 Convention, prohib-

iting the application of nonrefoulement to refugees who have committed crimes against international law. See supra note 157 (listing the internalional crimes). [author's note]
178. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 154, art. i.
179. See Helton, supra note 162, at 472.
180. M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between
the U.S. and the U.K-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law
and Policy, 15 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255, 258 (1987).
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proving law enforcement cooperation and combating terrorism, by excluding
from the scope of the political offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists." 181 It argued that the new treaty would close the loopholes created by the political offense exception.
These purposes were met with skepticism, and several congresspersons criticized the Administration for "neatly wrap[ping] [the Supplementary Treaty]
in the jargon of antiterrorism.11 8 2 Other congresspersons thought that the
treaty would provide "uneven and politically motivated justice," by making "it
easier [for Britain] to extradite terrorists and members of the outlawed Irish
Republican Army accused of violent crimes."' 83
While the treaty purportedly was needed to combat international terrorism,
some scholars"' and many congresspersons agree that the real purpose behind
the Supplementary Treaty was to eliminate the application of the political offense exception to Northern Irish fugitives in United States courts.185 Senator
D'Amato summed up the debates by stating that the treaty "singles out Irish
people, and subjects them to much narrower rules than any of our other treaties provide."' 88
As a backlash to the almost complete debilitation of the political offense
defense, Congress inserted a compromise provision into the Supplementary Extradition Treaty. This provision is Article 3(a).
c. Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty
Article 3(a) of the new treaty directly incorporates the principle of
nonrefoulement into the extradition process between the United States and the
United Kingdom.18 7 Article 3(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of
181. Ronald Reagan, Letter of Transmittal to the United States Senate, July 17, 1985, 24
I.L.M. 1104, reproduced from 131 CONG. REC. S9696 (July 17, 1985).
182. 132 CONG. REC. 16,797 (1986) (statement of Senator Dodd); see also 132 CONG. REC.
16,797-819 (1986) (reflecting speeches in favor of Article 3(a) by Senators Dodd, Kerry, Matthias, Hatch, Biden, and Levin).
183. 132 CONG. REC. 16,588 (1986) (statement of Senator Thurmond).
184. E.g., Bassiouni, supra note 180, at 264; Blakesley, supra note 176, at 118-20; Michael P.
Scharf, Note, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S. Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry
Provision of the Supplementary U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 257, 262-63
(1989).
Bassiouni argues that, given the fact that the United States has never tried to extradite a terrorist from the United Kingdom, and the fact that both United Kingdom and United States law and
jurisprudence adequately protect United States interests with respect to international terrorism, it
is difficult not to view the actual purpose of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty as an effort to
assist the United Kingdom in quelling Irish resistance. Bassiouni, supra note 180, at 264-65.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83; infra text accompanying note 186 (describing
the public statements of several senators).
186. 132 CONG. REC. 16,039 (1986) (statement of Senator D'Amato).
187. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 154, art. 3(a), as amended, in 132 CONG. REC. 16558
(1986).
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the competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the
request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish
him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that
he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or
restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality,
or political opinions.' 88

This provision embodies the principle of nonrefoulement.
The legislative intent behind Article 3(a) clearly reflects congressional concern over the fate of Irish fugitives. Senator Kerry stated that "[tihe problem

in finding the proper balance between the need to deal with the threat of international terrorism and the necessity for maintaining basic democratic traditions and individual safeguards poses a dilemma for both our nations." He
continued, "This balance .. .can only be achieved through the broad inter-

pretation of article 3(a)."' 18 Kerry concluded that "article 3(a) is about
human rights liberties and our distrust of systems of justice that don't respect
these fundamental safeguards."'
This concern overrode the traditional
United States policy of not judging the fairness of a foreign justice system.

With this provision, the Senate abandoned the rule of noninquiry,' 89 and provided some humanitarian relief for the political fugitives of Northern Ireland.
d.

Rule of noninquiry

By ratifying this amendment to the treaty, Congress abandoned its adherence to the rule of noninquiry. The rule of noninquiry concerns the traditional
practice of United States courts of not examining the fate that awaits a fugitive upon his return to the requesting state. 92 Historically, the judicial branch
has been reluctant to probe into the requesting state's judicial or prison system, and/or into whether the fugitive would receive a fair trial and treatment
in that state. However, Article 3(a) expressly requires a United States court to
examine the circumstances surrounding the extradition request and the fugitive's return to the requesting state. If the court thinks that the fugitive would
not receive fair treatment or trial, the court can refuse the extradition request.
Thus, Congress granted the judicial branch the authority to apply nonrefoulement, as reflected in Article 3(a), over the duty to extradite.
e.

Application of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty has been applied once since it be188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
132 CONG. REC. 16,798 (1986) (statement of Senator Kerry).
Id.
The rule of noninquiry traditionally prohibits a judicial body from examining the condi-

tions awaiting a fugitive upon his return to the requesting country. See Scharf, supra note 184, at
258.
192. For example, District Court Judge Sprizzo adhered to this principle at Doherty's extradition hearing. See infra note 302 (describing the application of the noninquiry rule).
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came effective on December 23, 1986.193 In In re Extradition of McMullen,
the district court faced an issue of first impression concerning the Supplementary Treaty-whether this treaty, as applied to McMullen, constituted an unlawful bill of attainder. 9"
McMullen participated in several political acts as a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA") before leaving the organization in
1977.196 He fled to California to escape a "death sentence levied upon him" by
PIRA.' 6 Upon his arrival in the United States, McMullen contacted Department of Justice officials, hoping to exchange information on PIRA activities
for asylum status. However, the deal fell through, and McMullen was arrested
upon the United Kingdom's extradition request. 197
The extradition magistrate found McMullen's acts to be political in nature
and denied the United Kingdom's extradition request under the political offense exception to the 1972 Extradition Treaty. 98 McMullen then fought to
receive asylum status or the less protective withholding of deportation for several years. However, McMullen lost the battle, and in 1986 the judge entered
an order that he be deported to Ireland. 99 He was transferred to New York to
catch the airplane on December 23, 1986, the same day the Supplementary
Treaty went into effect. Minutes before boarding the plane for Ireland, McMullen was arrested pursuant to the United Kingdom's new extradition request under the Supplementary Treaty. 00
Among other arguments, 01 McMullen asserted that the application of the
Supplementary Treaty to him amounted to an unconstitutional bill of attainder.2 0 2 The court first noted that in order for a legislative enactment to operate
as a bill of attainder, it must satisfy three requirements: (a) specification
of
20 3
the affected persons, (b) punishment, and (c) lack of a judicial trial.
McMullen first maintained that the Supplementary Treaty was unlawful, as
the Executive and Senate "specifically targeted him and two other suspected
193. See In re Extradition of McMullen, 769 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 953 F.2d
761 (2d Cir. 1992).
194. Id. at 1283.
195. Id. at 1282.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. McMullen's battle with INS officials is chronicled in the following cases: McMullen v.
INS, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986); In re McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981); In re
McMullen, Interim Decision 2831 (BIA 1980).
200. McMullen, 769 F. Supp. at 1283.
201. McMullen also argued that: (a) the application of the Supplementary Treaty to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution; (b) the Supplemental Treaty
violated the separation of powers doctrine; and (c) the totality of the government's actions in his
case violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
202. Id.; see U.S. CON T. art. I, § 9, cl.3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
1 ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder.
...
).
203. McMullen, 769 F. Supp. at 1284 (citing Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 (1984)).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:927

Irish Republican Army members, explicitly attempting to override judicial determinations favorable to them regarding the political offense exception contained in the 1972 Treaty."210 Second, McMullen argued that the retroactive
nature of the treaty and its significant limitations on the political offense exception amounted to a "punitive goal." 205 Finally, this legislative punishment
had been imposed upon McMullen without the benefit of a judicial
proceeding.206
The court agreed with him. It noted numerous references to the cases of
IRA members McMullen, Doherty, and Mackin in the congressional record in
support of limiting the political offense exception. 0 ' In addition, several senators stated that the goal of the new treaty was "to reverse the three cases
where extradition was denied and put an end to this development in the law
[successful use of the political offense exception]." 2 08 The court determined
that the purpose of the new treaty was clearly punitive, as its goal was to
punish "a small group of three persons whom the Government finds blameworthy because of their participation in IRA activities against the United Kingdom."20 9 Finally, the court found that the burdens of the new treaty (reversal
of a prior finding in his favor, the removal of the defense, and the near certain
extradition to the United Kingdom) were forced upon McMullen without a
trial. ' As all three elements were satisfied, the court ruled that the Supplementary Treaty was an unconstitutional bill of attainder as applied to McMullen.2" The court concluded by criticizing the new treaty. It stated:
[I]n effect, the Supplementary Treaty turns more than 100 years of extradition law on its head, reversing the traditional roles of the political and judicial branches and placing the political offense determination in the hands of
the political branches of government (which have expressed an intention to
eliminate the exception on a country-by-country basis), while forcing the
judiciary to probe the internal political workings of requesting countries.212
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision on January 7,
1992.213

As in McMullen, when courts deny an extradition request, the executive
branch often attempts to deport the fugitive to the requesting country. This is
204. Id. The two other IRA members were Doherty and Mackin. For a comprehensive discussion of the Doherty cases, see infra text accompanying notes 281-352. For a discussion of
Mackin's situation, see In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
205. McMullen, 769 F. Supp. at 1284.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1285.

208.

Id. (quoting statement of Senator Lugar, 132 CONG. REC. 16,586 (1986)).

209. Id. at 1289. The court stated that the retroactive nature of the treaty and the fact that no
other United States treaty contained such a restrictive political offense exception supported its
punitive nature. Id.
210. Id. at 1290.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1289 n.14.
213. McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1992).
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termed "disguised extradition," 2'14 or "de facto extradition. '21 5
4.

Disguised Extradition

Use of the political offense exception is one way an asylum state can refuse
to extradite a person to the requesting state.2 16 Reasons for circumventing the
extradition process include the expense involved, the delay involved, or simply
21 7
that the requesting state has a weak case and the outcome is uncertain.
Many asylum states have avoided this situation by circumventing the formal
extradition process through the use of immigration laws or extralegal methods.
Disguised extradition occurs when a state accomplishes with immigration
laws what it could not do under an extradition treaty, namely, returning the
fugitive to the requesting country. Methods of rendition employed by states
include (a) using immigration laws, such as deportation, 21 8 expulsion, or exclusion, and (b) using extralegal methods, such as unlawful seizure or illegal abduction.2"9 As the United States recently deported Doherty to the United

Kingdom, this Note focuses on the use of immigration laws as disguised
extradition.
There are several ways in which state officials may utilize immigration laws
as "disguised extradition" to send an individual to a specific country. In the

United States, for example, disguised extradition occurs when the Attorney
22 0

General exercises his discretion to block an individual's country designation.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a), the Attorney General may prohibit an individual's
travel to the country of his choice if it "would be prejudicial to the interests of
the United States. ' 221 Another tactic employed by the INS is when INS officials block the deportation of an individual not only to the country of his
choice, but to any country other than the one which the individual originally
had requested. 2 The INS also may label an individual as a national security
risk, and expel him to a specific country before he has the chance to make
travel arrangements of his choice. 223 By engaging in these tactics, the INS
uses immigration procedures to accomplish what could not be accomplished
214. See I BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 147.
215. See WIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 57.
216. However, use of this exception usually strains relations between the two nations. Id. at 58.
217. See EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 166, at 496.
218. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988). Deportation is a method by which a country returns an
individual to his country of origin if that individual does not meet the criteria for legal entry into
the country.
219. 1 BASSIOUNI, supra note 131, at 191, 196.
220. See infra notes 313-24 and accompanying text (discussing the INS's decision to block
Doherty's country designation, and the district court's affirmance of this decision).
221. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988); see also infra note 319 and accompanying text for a full
description of the statute.
222. See In re Badalamenti, 19 1. & N. Dec. 623 (1988) (where the Immigration Board of
Appeals chastised INS officials for attempting to block the deportation of Badalamenti to any
country other than Italy).
223. Id. at 626.
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through legal extradition procedures-the return of an individual to a specific
country.
Some scholars have questioned the legality of disguised extradition. " ' This
is due to the fact that extradition procedures are full of specific procedural
safeguards that protect the fugitive. In contrast, deportation procedures require few procedural elements, and the fugitive does not have the same rights
as he does with extradition. Even United States courts have criticized the use
of disguised extradition. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court stated that
"the immigration laws of this country were not enacted to facilitate the punishment of one convicted of an offense against another country's laws."'22
One way to avoid using disguised extradition procedures is through the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.226 This doctrine allows the asylum state to
choose between extraditing the fugitive or exercising jurisdiction over the fugitive and prosecuting the fugitive itself. The asylum state would use the laws of
the requesting nation in its adjudication of the fugitive, and the fugitive would
serve his sentence (if any) in the asylum state's prison. This allows the asylum
state to maintain political harmony with the requesting state. Although at
least one scholar fears that prosecuting the fugitive will violate jurisdictional
principles,2 2 7 the doctrine has been utilized more frequently in the last
decade.228
The political offense exception embodies the principle of nonrefoulement. It
bars the return of a fugitive to a country in which he might face persecution
based on his nationality, race, religion, membership in a social group, or political views. While the current Supplementary Extradition Treaty narrows the
crimes that fall within its political offense exception, Article 3(a) broadly authorizes the reviewing court to examine the conditions that await the fugitive
in the requesting country if returned. The court may examine the judicial system of the requesting country to ensure that the fugitive will receive a fair
trial and punishment. If the United Kingdom had filed a second extradition
request for Doherty, the reviewing court would have had to examine the his224. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL. EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
123 (1974); EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 166, at 496; WIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 62-63.
225. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1892); see also Brief of Respondent,
INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1992) (No. 90-925) (available on 1991 LEXIS,
Genfed library, Brief file, at *16) ("The extradition statute is wrongfully circumvented and the
immigration laws abused when the latter are employed to return a fugitive to a country denied his
extradition in order that he serve his sentence in that country.").
226. The term aut dedere aut judicare was coined by Hugo Grotius in the sixteenth century. It
means "to extradite or prosecute." WIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 7-8. This language is contained
in several extradition and international terrorism conventions, and obligates a state either to extradite a fugitive to the requesting state, or to prosecute the fugitive itself. Id. See generally Declan
Costello, International Terrorism and the Development of the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare,
10 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 483 (1975) (analyzing the concept of aut dedere aut judicare in international conventions).
227. See SHEARER, supra note 132, at 89.
228. See David M. Kennedy, et al., The Extraditionof Mohammed Hamadei, 31 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 5, 11-12 (1990).
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tory of the political strife in Northern Ireland in order to determine whether
its current judicial system doles out fair and equitable justice to both Catholics
and Protestants.
E. Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland is a territory rife with political turmoil and violence.2 29
This turmoil has created many areas in which the Northern Irish face persecution based on political opinion. An examination of both the general strife and
the effects of the current state-of-emergency legislation is crucial to understanding the impact that Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Extradition
Treaty2 ° will have on the extradition process between the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Northern Ireland.
While the conflict in Northern Ireland dates back to the thirteenth century,231 historians agree that the "genesis of the modern Irish 'troubles'" began during the civil rights movement in the 1960s. 232 Although Catholic activ229. One commentator reports that over 3000 civilians have died and 30,000 have been
maimed or injured in Northern Ireland since 1969. Roger Myers, A New Remedy for Northern
Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 3, 6 (1990).
230. See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text (describing the contents of Article 3(a)).
One scholarly source specifically mentions Northern Ireland in the context of whether a fugitive
will receive "fair treatment at all stages of the proceeding ... or due process of law [as embodied
in the United States Constitution] when submitted to a given country's criminal justice system
....
[Slome countries [such as Northern Ireland], may single out the terrorist for more rigorous
treatment in detention or in the judicial process." EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 166, at 505.
231. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

OF JURISTS,

STATES OF EMERGENCY:

THEIR

IMPACT

ON

HUMAN RIGHTS 219 (1983) [hereinafter STATES OF EMERGENCY]. English authorities gave large
tracts of land requisitioned from rebellious landlords to English colonists. Id. In addition,
thousands of Scottish settlers migrated to Northern Ireland and worked the large plantations. Id.
232. Myers, supra note 229, at 3 n.I; Thomas P. Foley, Public Security and Individual Freedom: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 284, 284 (1982). For a
more detailed description of the history of Northern Ireland, see MORLEY AYEARST, THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1970); ROGER H. HULL, THE IRISH TRIANGLE
CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1976); RICHARD ROSE, NORTHERN IRELAND: TIME OF CHOICE

(1976).
Since the sixteenth century, English kings and parliaments have asserted strategic and economic
interests over the inhabitants of Northern Ireland by sending large groups of settlers to take over
Irish lands. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 219. While the earlier inhabitants of
Northern Ireland were Roman Catholics, most of the new settlers were Protestants. Varying religious and financial factors kept these two groups from commingling, and the current political and
religious factions were well formed by the eighteenth century. Id.
In 1920, the British Parliament passed the Government of Ireland Act, which formally partitioned northern and southern Ireland by creating separate parliaments of limited powers for each
section. Foley, supra, at 285 (citing Government of Ireland Act, 1920, 10 & I I Geo. 5, chs. 6, 7).
Great Britain allegedly partitioned Ireland to safeguard political power for the Northern Protestants in their own state despite the overall majority of Catholics. ld.
The northern section, comprised of six counties within the province of Ulster, became Northern
Ireland, and continuously has remained under British control. Id. The southern section, comprised
of twenty-six counties, became the Irish Free State in 1922, and is independent of Great Britain.
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ists pushed for equal rights and opportunities for both Catholics and
Protestants, Protestant mobs repeatedly attacked them during the 1960s."' 3

The Northern Irish Government called in British troops to help regain control
in 1969.34 As the violence escalated, the British Government entered and es-

tablished direct rule over Northern Ireland in 1972.238
The struggle over political power has left Northern Ireland deeply divided.

The political lines are split between the Unionists or Loyalists, who wish to
maintain the state of union with Great Britain, and the Republicans or Nationalists, who wish to reinstate a unified Ireland."3 6 Each faction has its own
parties, both nonviolent and paramilitary. : 7 In order to keep peace among the
Id. The division of Ireland created a Protestant stronghold in the north. Protestants enjoy a twothirds majority over a Catholic minority; yet the Protestants are a minority overall in Ireland.
Francis W. O'Brien, Irish Terrorists and Extradition: The Tuite Case, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 249,
251 (1983).
233. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 220. Contrary to popular belief, the struggle in
Northern Ireland is not over religion. According to the London Times:
There are two communities in Northern Ireland, different in their origins, nursing
different historical myths, possessing distinguishable cultures, having different songs
and heroes, and wearing different denominations of the same religion. Religion is the
clearest badge of these differences. But the conflict is not about religion. It is about
the self-assertion of two distinct communities, one of which is dominant in the public
affairs of the province.
Foley, supra note 232, at 286 (quoting THE TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 30, 1969, at 7).
234. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 221. Unfortunately, the Catholic community
perceived the British army as being directed against them-a notion that was anchored during a
series of official misconduct and "improper interrogation procedures"; for example, the Falls Road
Belfast operation of July 1970; the Londonderry shootings in early July 1971; the internment
operation of August 1971; and "Bloody Sunday" cf January 1972. Id.
235. Id. at 223; see also Kelly D. Talcott, Note, Questions of Justice: U.S. Courts' Powers of
Inquiry Under Article 3(a) of the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 474, 478 (1987) (describing the strife in Northern Ireland and
how a United States court can use Article 3(a) to examine the judicial process in that country).
236. Foley, supra note 232, at 286.
237. The following are parties under the Unionist flag:
First, the Unionist party governed Northern Ireland without interruption until 1972. Foley,
supra note 232, at 287 (citing THOMAS MOODY, ['HE ULSTER QUESTION: 1603-1973, at 32, 48
(1974)). During this period, discrimination against the Catholic community was widespread in
housing, employment and the administration of justice. Id. at 288.
Second, the Ulster Volunteer Force ("UVF") was born in the early twentieth century yet
largely disappeared after the 1922 partition. It then reemerged in the 1960s as a terrorist group.
Foley, supra note 232, at 290-91 (citing MARTIN DILLON & DENIS LEHANE, POLITICAL MURDER
IN NORTHERN IRELAND 28 (1973)).
Third, the Ulster Defense Association ("UDA") was founded by the working class in 1971. It is
the largest Loyalist group, and its goal is to demonstrate against the idea of a united Ireland. Id.

at 291 (citing

WILLIAM

D.

FLACKES.

A

POLITICAL. DIRECTORY

1968-1979 147 (1980)).

Fourth, the Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") is a Northern Irish patrol comprised of volun-

teer Protestants in the community. Id. (citing
IRELAND 25 (1980)).

KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN

Fifth, the Ulster Special Constabulary ("B Specials") was a paramilitary auxiliary police force
of volunteer Protestants initially used to supplement the British forces in Northern Ireland.
STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 220.
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two factions, England has kept Northern Ireland in a state of emergency since
1972.2.8

1. State of Emergency Provisions
The United Kingdom established direct rule through the passage of the

Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1972.239 This Act authorized
2 40
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to be Chief Executive Officer,
and it dismissed the Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont. 241 The Act also
authorized the British parliament to make laws for Northern Ireland. 2 Although direct rule was intended to last for only one year, it remains in force
today .
In 1973, a commission chaired by Lord Diplock of Great Britain recommended the modification of many criminal procedures to help cope with the

growing violence in Northern Ireland.2 41 This commission examined measures
that could be used to deal with terrorist activity other than the measure of
"internment by the Executive. ' 24 5 Many of the Diplock Commission recommendations found their way into a new law passed in 1973-the Northern
The following parties fall under the Republican flag:
First, the Irish Republican Army ("IRA") was created in the early twentieth century to push
for a united Ireland. This group became a proscribed organization in the mid-1970s. Foley, supra
note 232, at 289 (citing TIM P. COOGAN, THE IRA 21 (1980)).
Second, the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA") is a paramilitary offshoot of the
IRA. This group has directed an assassination campaign against representatives of the British
Army and all Loyalist groups. Id. at 289-90 (citing TIM P. COOGAN, THE IRA 61 (1980)).
Third, the Sinn Fein is the legal political arm of the IRA. See CHI. TRIS., Feb. 1, 1992, § 1, at
15.
Fourth, the Irish National Liberation Army ("INLA") is a military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party. Foley, supra note 232, at 288 (citing WILLIAM D. FLACKES, A POLITICAL
DIRECTORY 1968-1979 72).

238.

STATES OF EMERGENCY,

supra note 231, at 220. Northern Ireland's first emergency legis-

lation in response to the political turmoil that erupted shortly after Ireland was partitioned was
the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act of 1922. See Foley, supra note 232, at 288. This Act
authorized the Minister of Home Affairs to take all steps and issue all orders as might be necessary for preserving peace and maintaining order. Id.
239. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 223 (citing Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1972). This Act replaced the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922. Many of the emergency provisions contained in the Special Powers Act have been
retained in the Temporary Provisions Act. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. The Act is renewable on an annual basis by a percentage vote in the British Parliament.
id.
244. See Foley, supra note 232, at 291 (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, CMD 5, No.
5185 (1972) (Lord Diplock, Chairman) [hereinafter DIPLOCK REPORTI. The criminal justice system in place in Northern Ireland is referred to as the "Diplock court system."

245.

STATES OF EMERGENCY,

supra note 231, at 223.
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Ireland (Emergency Provision) Act.246 This Act constitutes the bulk of the
current Northern Irish criminal code.
The Emergency Provisions Act ("EPA") controls much of the personal
rights and freedoms that the citizens of Northern Ireland possess today. 4"

EPA severely curtails the pretrial rights of a suspect. Police in Northern Ireland have the authority to arrest a suspect without a warrant when they have
reasonable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime or will
commit a crime.248 The police also may arrest anyone whom they suspect is a
terrorist,249 and may determine reasonable cause based on their own subjective
beliefs.2"'
Once a suspect is detained, he is not allowed, for all practical purposes, to
consult with an attorney.2 5 ' British officials maintain that communication is
allowed between suspects and their attorneys; but since the police are allowed
to be present during any consultation session, both the suspects and their attorneys find consultation ineffective. 252
Human rights organizations have linked this denial of access to an attorney
with the high number of complaints of ill treatment by suspects."'2 British
officials investigated the high number of complaints after Ireland filed its case
before the European Human Rights Court. 2 5 Ireland alleged that British Se246. Id. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provision) Act, 1973, was later combined with the
Northern Ireland (Young Persons) Act, 1974, and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
(Amendment) Act, 1975, to become the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978
[hereinafter EPA]. Talcott, supra note 235, at 478 n.22.
247. EPA recently was supplemented by the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act, 1984, ch. 8 [hereinafter PTA]. Talcott, supra note 235, at 478 n.22. PTA applies to the
entire British Commonwealth and gives police the power to arrest people whom the police have
"reasonable grounds" to suspect are involved with terrorism. The police can detain a suspect for
up to forty-eight hours without charging him with a crime, and the Secretary of State may increase the detainment period for up to five additional days. Id. at 479 (citing PTA § 12(4), (5)).
Police do not need a warrant to arrest, and they need not file charges until the internee's seventh
day in detainment. Sources indicate that over ten percent of Northern Irish citizens have been
arrested under PTA. Id.
248. Id. (citing Criminal Law Act § 2 (1967)).
249. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 227. It is not uncommon for the police to
arrest a suspect as soon as the suspect is released. I'd. at 226.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 227.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310/71, 15 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HR. 76
(1972) (Court report). Ireland alleged that the United Kingdom Security Force was engaging in
administrative activity in violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Protocol and Article 5 of the European Declaration of Human Rights. 15 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. at 78, 80. The European
Human Rights Court eventually found that five of the practices the Security Forces had used to
secure confessions from Irish resisters "constituted inhumane and degrading treatment." id. at
130. These five techniques included wall-standing, hooding, subjection to high pitched continuous
noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food and drink. Kerry S. Sullivan, Pretrial Deten-

tion of Suspects in Northern Ireland: A Violation of Fundamental Human Rights, II NYL.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 297, 303-04 (1990). The United Kingdom eventually suspended the use
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curity Forces were torturing IRA prisoners in violation of international law.
Subsequent investigations revealed that the Security Forces had engaged in

"sensory deprivation techniques," '5 5 had assaulted the internees, and had
forced the internees to do tiring calisthenics. British officials have abandoned
most of these techniques and have tried to improve the conditions at the infamous Long Kesh and Maze Prisons. 56 However, despite the efforts of the
United Kingdom, reports of prisoner maltreatment surface on a continuing
basis. " ' Many critics contend that police interrogation will continue as long as
EPA exists because its provisions leave suspects in highly vulnerable
positions. 58
In addition to pretrial provisions, EPA also alters the traditional criminal
trial system in Northern Ireland in two ways: (a) it abolishes trial by jury "in
order to avoid acquittals due to bias or intimidation, ' 2 59 and (b) it modifies
"common law rules on the admissibility of confessions, whether oral or written

.. . so as to make it easier for the prosecution to obtain a conviction based
upon an alleged confession." 26 The traditional right to trial by jury and the
standard of inadmissibility of an involuntary confession have been jettisoned in
favor of maintaining public order.
One consequence of these two unique developments has been the increased
of these five techniques and replaced them with the Detention of Terrorist Order. STATES OF
EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 223; see also David Lowry, Ill-Treatment, Brutality, and Torture: Some Thoughts upon the "'Treatment"of Irish Political Prisoners, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 553

(1973) (analyzing the treatment of IRA prisoners in Northern Irish prisons).
255. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 227.
256. The United Kingdom installed the following safeguards to ameliorate conditions:
mandatory medical examinations of all internees; comprehensive record keeping; the immediate
report of complaints of ill-treatment; and instructions that forbade the use of violence, threats, or
insults to obtain confessions. Id. at 228.
257. In 1978, after reports that seventy-eight internees had been maltreated, the United Kingdom conducted yet another investigation led by Sir Bennett. Id. at 229-30. This report revealed
that the United Kingdom had not eradicated police misconduct during interrogations. Id. In fact,
between 1972 and 1978, over 119 suspects filed personal injury suits against the British Security
Forces. Id. at 230. Further, forensic medical officials condemned the large number of bruises,
contusions, abrasions, ruptured eardrums, hair pulling, increased mental agitation, states of excessive anxiety, hypertension, and hyperflexion of joints. Id.
258. Suspects remain alone with interrogators for up to seven days without counsel. Id. at 231.
259. Id. at 232. A person indicted on a scheduled offense does not receive the right to trial by
jury. Instead, the case is heard by one judge, who acts as finder of both fact and law. Scheduled
offenses include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, false imprisonment, assault causing bodily
harm, riot, theft, and terrorist types of crimes such as explosive violations and hijacking. Foley,
supra note 232, at 292-93 (citing EPA § 30, sched. 4 & n.2).
260. STATES OF EMERGENCY, supra note 231, at 232. Under this reduced standard, any statement made by the indictee is admissible unless the indictee makes a prima facie showing that the
Security Forces engaged in torture, or inhumane or degrading treatment to induce the sentence.
Talcott, supra note 235, at 483. One study reflects that in 56% of the cases tried in the Diplock
System, the only evidence was the indictee's statement. Over 70% of the convictions obtained
were based primarily on statements made to the police. See Foley, supra note 232, at 299 n.1 13
(citing KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., TEN YEARS ON IN NORTHERN IRELAND 44.(1980)).
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use of police informants, otherwise known as "supergrasses." 26 1 Prosecutors
have enjoyed a high rate of convictions at a single proceeding under the informant system.262 Although the use of "supergrass" witnesses has recently
declined, the detention and conviction of suspects based on the testimony of
one person still occurs in Northern Ireland. 236 The above-mentioned practices
reflect EPA's trampling on the long-held t:radition in Anglo jurisprudence that
a suspect is entitled to certain rights under due process of law.
Many scholars contend that EPA has served only to exacerbate the very
conditions it was supposed to calm. One critic charges that EPA creates "resentment, drives people into terrorists groups, and undermines basic respect
for the rule of law in Northern Ireland." 6" EPA has played a large part in the
increased violence in Northern Ireland and has contributed to the increase in
terrorist acts by Irish resisters.
2. Terrorism in Northern Ireland
One of the daily features of life ip Northern Ireland is acts of terrorism.
Terrorism is not easily defined. The most commonly used definition of terrorism is "the intentional or extremely reckless application of violence against
innocent individuals or property for the purpose of obtaining a military, political or religious end." 26 Another definition includes "any conduct by which the
perpetrators exert violence upon innocents . . . in order to reap some political
or military advantage or benefit .
,,a These two definitions focus on dan-

ger or injury to innocent civilians.
While innocent civilians are not permissible targets for terrorist attacks,
some groups are. Permissible targets include members of military forces or
groups opposed to one's own military group. 267 Terrorism is not "killing or
other violence directed against the opposition in military, civil or international
strife, for political or military purposes. ' 2 8 Political acts directed against "the
opposition" are not considered terrorism. This is one reason why most extradition treaties include an exception for political offenses, as most political offenses do not constitute terrorism.
The Geneva Conventions and Protocols outline international law concerning
the conduct to which parties to any type of strife must adhere.26 9 Geneva law
261. Steven C. Green, Supergrasses and the Legal System in Britain and Northern Ireland,
102 LAW Q. REV. 198, 198 (1986). "Grass" is slang for informer, while "supergrass" refers to
those who tell authorities about a large number of suspects and who appear at their trials as the
principle witnesses for the state. Id.
262. Talcott, supra note 235, at 484.
263. Id.
264. See Foley, supra note 232, at 296.
265. See Blakesley, supra note 176, at 902-03.
266. Id. at 903.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 273-76 (describing the theory of permissible targets).
268. See infra text accompanying notes 273-76.
269. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
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sets up the parameters in which targets are acceptable according to the type of

conflict. The fundamental principle behind Geneva Law is the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg ("Declaration").2 70 This Declaration states:
The only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy . . . . [F]or this
purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men ....
[Tihis object would be exceeded by the [useless aggravation] of the sufferings of disabled men, or render[ing] their death inevitable.2 7'

In modern terms, this principle generally prohibits indiscriminate attacks that
72
place civilian populations at risk.
Thus, innocent civilians are protected under the theory of protected
targets.2 73 This theory provides that certain targets be protected from all forms
of terrorism.2 74 Protected targets include "innocent civilians, duly accredited
diplomatic and international personnel acting within their legitimate functions,
international civil aviation and the mails, and other means of international
communications . ... ,,"7 A civilian is defined as "any person who is not a
member of the belligerent armed forces

. . .

or of associated militia, incorpo-

rated paramilitary police or voluntary corps .... "I"
Several types of armed conflict exist. The Geneva Conventions outline rules
for conflicts between two countries (international strife) or conflicts between
the government and a rebel group within the same country (noninternational

strife). The strife in Northern Ireland can be characterized as the latter
-noninternational strife. Thus, the Northern Irish conflict falls under Article
7
III of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.

Article III regulates the conduct of noninternational armed conflicts, and
tion I]; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I1]; Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 111]; Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3576, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, June 8, 1977,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts, June 8, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Protocol II].
270. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGULATION OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 148 (1990).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 199-200 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
1975).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Protocol II, supra note 269, art. 111; see also MCCOUBREY, supra note 270, at 113 (defining a civilian under international law).
277. See Shelton, supra note 160, at 151. But see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 183 (1987).
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prohibits mutilation, cruel treatment, torture, outrages upon personal dignity
and humanity, and degrading treatment of persons taking no active part in the

hostilities.278 The application of Article III generally holds that persons taking
an active part in hostilities are fair targets. 7 Thus, under Article III the participants of the conflict in Northern Ireland are the British Security Forces,
the Northern Irish Security Forces, the Irish Republican Army, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Any member of these groups is a permissible
target for the opposition groups.2 80 Nonmembers are not permissible targets,
as Article III absolutely bars indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians.
The pivotal question in the Doherty case is whether Doherty's participation
in the ambush of the British Security Forces captain was a terrorist act or a

legitimate political crime. If the captain was a permissible target under Article
III, Doherty's participation would be political in nature, and he would be enti-

tled to the protection of nonrefoulement as embodied in the political offense
exception. On the other hand, if the captain was an innocent civilian, Doherty's participation would be terrorism, and his extradition would be much

more difficult to prohibit:
II.

THE DOHERTY CASES

A.

Factual Background

Joseph Doherty was a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army
("PIRA"), a paramilitary offshoot of the Irish Republican Army ("IRA").28
On May 2, 1980, the PIRA directed Doherty and three other PIRA members
to ambush a convoy of British soldiers.2 82 The four PIRA members entered a
house at 371 Antrim Road in Belfast, where they awaited the British convoy. 28 Several hours later, a group of five British soldiers drove by the house
at 371 Antrim and stopped in front.2 84 The soldiers were members of the Special Air Service of the British Army.28 The two groups exchanged gunfire,
278. Protocol II, supra note 269, art. Ill.
279. MCCOUBREY, supra note 270, at 148.

280. See Shelton, supra note 160, at 151 ("Doherty attacked military targets during an ongoing internal armed conflict and should be considered [a] political [offender].").
281. In re Doherty (Doherty 1), 599 F. Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
The United States considers both the IRA and the PIRA to be "official terrorist groups." See
Brief for Respondent at *21 n.21, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. (No. 90-925) (available on 1991
Genfed library, Brief file) (citing UNITED STATES STATE DEPARTMENT, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL
TERRORISM: 1988 82 (1989)). The same report also lists the African National Congress ("ANC")
as an official terrorist group--yet President Bush recently received Nelson Mandela, the leader of
the ANC, at the White House, and Mandela addressed a joint session of Congress after his release from jail. See id. (citing Maureen Dowd, The Mandela Visit; Mandela Declines to Rule Out
Force, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1990, at Al).
282. Doherty 1, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.

1992]

JOSEPH DOHERTY AND THE INS

which resulted in the death of British Captain Herbert Richard Westacott. 286

British officials arrested Doherty on murder charges and held him in Crumlin
Road Prison pending trial.28s On June 10, 1981, after the trial was completed,

but prior to formal sentencing, Doherty escaped from prison. The court sentenced Doherty in absentia of four crimes: murder, attempted murder, illegal

possession of firearms and ammunition, and belonging to a proscribed organization (the PIRA).288 After his escape, Doherty made his way to New York,
where he illegally entered the United States.2 89 Doherty worked in a bar in
20
Manhattan until June 18, '1983, when INS officials arrested him.
Chief Judge Motley of the Southern District of New York issued a provisional warrant of arrest on June 27, 1983, pursuant to Article VIII of the
1972 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom.2"' The United Kingdom filed a formal request for extradition in New
York on August 16, 1983.292 The Southern District of New York held an extradition hearing in March and April of 1984.293
B.

The Doherty Decisions

In In re Doherty (Doherty 1),29" district court Judge Sprizzo determined
that Doherty's actions fell under the political offense exception of the 1972
Extradition Treaty then in force between the United States and the United

Kingdom. 295 Unless Doherty fell within the ambit of the political offense exception in this treaty, he would be extradited to Northern Ireland to serve his
life sentence. Thus, the court examined the parameters of the political offense
exception in the 1972 Treaty.
286.
287.
288.
289.
1990).
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice (Doherty V), 908 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir.

Id.
Doherty 1, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
Id.
This hearing was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184, which states:
Whenever there is a treaty . . . for extradition between the United States and any
foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States . . . may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the
crimes provided for by such treaty . . . issue his warrant for the apprehension of the
person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice [or] judge . . . to the
end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and considered.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988).
294. Doherty 1, 599 F. Supp. at 270.
295. Id. The treaty in force in 1983 was the 1972 Extradition Treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom. Doherty's actions would not be considered political under the
current Supplementary Treaty between these countries. See'supra notes 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing the evisceration of the political offense exception under the Supplementary
Treaty).
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In order to determine whether the ambush was a political act, the court first
examined the smoldering situation in Northern Ireland. 2 " It next determined
the scope of the political offense exception. The court stated that "no act
[should] be regarded as political where the nature of the act is such as to be
violative of international law, and inconsistent with international standards of

civilized conduct. '2 97 It reasoned that five factors controlled the question, 298
and paid special attention to the fact that the ambush did not cause "indis-riminate personal injury, death, and property damage,"' 299 The court also
noted that PIRA was a highly structured and organized group, unlike many of
the "amorphous" political groups.300 Focusing on the above circumstances and
characterizations, the court concluded that Doherty's actions fell within "the
political offense exception in its most classic form." '' It ruled that both the
killing of Captain Westacott and Doherty's escape from prison were political
in character, and denied the United Kingdom's request for the extradition of
Doherty.302
United States v. Doherty (Doherty 11) s0' involved the United States' unsuccessful appeal of Judge Sprizzo's decision denying the United Kingdom's extradition request. 304 Unsatisfied with this decision, the United States argued to
the district court that it should be granted collateral review of the decision by
means of declaratory jiidgment. 305 The court rejected this argument, noting
that to protect the fugitive's rights, Congress had provided the requesting

party with only one means of redress-to refile the extradition request with

another extradition magistrate.306 No other remedy, such as declaratory judg296. Doherty 1,599 F. Supp. at 273; see also notes 229-64 and accompanying text (discussing
background information on the conflict in Northern Ireland).
297. Doherty 1,599 F. Supp. at 274.
298. The court examined (a) the nature of the act, (b) the context in which it was committed,
(c) the status of the party committing the act, (d) the nature of the organization on whose behalf
the act was committed, and (e) the particularized circumstances of the place where the act takes
place. Id. at 275.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 276.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 277. The court expressly stated that the Diplock court system did not prohibit Doherty from receiving a fair trial. The court concluded that "both Unionists and Republicans who
commit offenses of a political character can and do receive fair and impartial justice and that the
courts of Northern Ireland will continue to scrupulously and courageously discharge their responsibilities in that regard." Id. at 276. Although the district court adhered to the doctrine of noninquiry, Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty was designed to eliminate this possibility. See
supra text accompanying note 192 (discussing the rule of noninquiry under Article 3(a) of the
Supplementary Treaty).
303. 615 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
304. Id. at 761.
305. Id. at 757-58. The United States argued that declaratory judgment "seeks literally nothing more than the same right to obtain judicial review of an adverse extradition decision that
Doherty would have had if the matter had gone the other way." Id. at 758.
306. Id. at 760.
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ment, was available to the United States. 30 7 The court denied the United
States Government's motion and granted Doherty's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.308
United States v. Doherty (Doherty 111)30 concerned another unsuccessful
appeal by the United States Government. Before the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, the government challenged the district court's denial of its motion for
judicial review of the extradition decision.310 The Second Circuit characterized
this appeal as "an attempt by the Government to escape from the long held
principle that when an extradition magistrate acting under 18 U.S.C. § 3184
refuses to certify a person sought to be extradited . ..the Government's sole
recourse is to submit a request to another extradition magistrate.1 311 The
court concluded that it would not upset the "remedial balance" with respect to
extradition, which had been achieved for over seventy-five years, and affirmed
the district court's ruling against the United States Government. 1 2
Doherty v. Meese (Doherty IV)3"' involved Doherty's unsuccessful attempt
to circumvent the Attorney General's review of his situation.3 14 Five months
after the Doherty III decision, Doherty withdrew his application for political
asylum and conceded deportability. 3 5 Doherty requested immediate deportation to the Republic of Ireland.3 6 The motivation behind this move was the
pending ratification of the 1985 Supplementary Extradition Treaty between
307. Id.
308. Id. at 761.
309. 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1986).
310. Id. at 503.
311. Id. at 492-93.
312. Id. at 497.
313. 808 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1986).
314. Id. at 944.
315. Id. at 940. The procedural aspects of immigration law require a refugee seeking asylum to
file a petition before the district director of the local INS office. Stephen H. Smith, Forum
Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 1297, 1303-10 (1986). When a petitioner files a petition for asylum status, he automatically is considered for withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988). Id. at 1304. He
receives a hearing before an immigration judge-the lowest level of immigration adjudications. Id.
at 1309. Immigration adjudications follow agency law. If the petitioner or the United States Government is dissatisfied with the outcome of the initial hearing, either party or both may appeal the
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). The BIA will review the case and make a
decision. This decision may be appealed to a federal district court under an abuse of discretion
standard. See infra note 335 (reviewing decisions that have applied the abuse of discretion standard). At any time, INS officials may request that the matter be certified for review by the Attorney General. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1988). "The Board shall refer to the Attorney General for review
of its decision all cases which . . . [t]he Attorney General directs the Board to refer to him ...
[or] a majority of the Board believes should be referred to the Attorney General . . . [or] the
Commissioner requests be referred to the Attorney General .
I..."
Id.
During the extradition hearing, Doherty had applied for asylum, and thus automatically for
withholding of deportation. He then requested and received a stay on his asylum petition pending
the outcome of the extradition hearing and its two subsequent appeals. Doherty later withdrew his
asylum petition in order to return to the Republic of Ireland. Doherty IV, 808 F.2d at 940.
316. Doherty IV, 808 F.2d at 940.
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the United States and the United Kingdom.3" 7 Under the new treaty, Doherty's actions would not fall under the political offense exception, and there
was a strong possibility that he would be extradited back to the United King-

dom.318 As Doherty wanted to return to Ireland, where he faced a ten-year
prison sentence rather than the life sentence in the United Kingdom, Doherty
designated Ireland as his country of deportation." 9
INS officials denied Doherty's country designation of Ireland on the grounds
that deportation to Ireland "would be prejudicial to the interests of the United
States in its relations with other nations concerning the fight against interna-

tional terrorism."3'2 Instead, INS officials designated the United Kingdom as
the country of deportation. At a hearing before the immigration judge on September 19, 1986, the judge reversed the INS decision and ordered Doherty to

return immediately to Ireland. " ' However, the INS appealed this decision to
the Board of Immigration Review ("BIA"). 32 During this time, Doherty petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus releasing him from prison
and allowing immediate deportation to Ireland.3"3 The district court denied
this petition, and Doherty appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 2
Doherty argued that the United States Government was delaying his deportation to Ireland solely to ensure that the new Supplementary Extradition
Treaty would be ratified before Doherty was allowed to leave the United
States.3 29 The Second Circuit rejected Doherty's argument. The court stated
that much of the delay in Doherty's case was his own doing, "2 ' and that INS
317. Id.
318. Id. As the Supplementary Treaty can be applied retroactively, if the United Kingdom had
filed a second extradition request Doherty might have faced a possible extradition to Northern
Ireland instead of his deportation to the United Kingdom.
319. Id. A refugee can designate a country of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a), which
provides:
The deportation of an alien in the United States provided for in this chapter . . .
shall be directed by the Attorney General to a country promptly designated by the
alien if that country is willing to accept him into its territory, unless the Attorney
General, in his discretion, concludes that deportation to such country would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1988). Ireland had agreed to accept Doherty. Doherty IV, 808 F.2d at 941.
320. Doherty IV, 808 F.2d at 940-41.
321. Id. at 941.
322. Id. The BIA eventually ruled on March 1I,1987, that Doherty be deported to Ireland, as
no clear evidence showed that granting the deportation request would be prejudicial to United
States' interests. Doherty v. INS (Doherty V), 908 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1990). During October, 1987, the INS requested that the matter be reviewed by Attorney General Meese under 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(h) (1988). Id. Attorney General Meese rejected Ireland as the designated country in
a decision dated June 9, 1988. Id.
323. Doherty IV, 808 F.2d at 941.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. The court reminded Doherty that he had stayed the asylum hearings himself pending
the outcome of the extradition decision and its two appeals. Id. Doherty requested that the asylum
proceedings be stayed on March 18, 1985. He filed a motion to continue the proceedings on September 3, 1986. Id.
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had reasonably exercised its discretion under3 2the
Immigration and Nationality
7
Act to reject Doherty's country designation.
Having lost the battle to return to Ireland, on December 3, 1987, Doherty
moved to reopen his asylum proceedings so that he could (a) withdraw Ireland

as the country of designation for deportation, and (b) submit an application
for asylum status and for withholding of deportation. 28 Doherty withdrew Ireland as his designated country because of a new treaty pending ratification
between Northern Ireland and Ireland.3 2 Like the Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, this treaty narrowed the political offense exception and required Ireland to extradite fugitives who had committed crimes in Northern Ireland
back to that country.330 The INS denied this motion.
However, the BIA decided on appeal that Doherty had established a prima

facie case for relief based on a well-founded fear of persecution in Northern
Ireland 3 1 Thus, it set a date for an asylum hearing. Once again, INS officials
requested the matter for certification to the new Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh.32

Attorney General Thornburgh reviewed this decision. On June 30, 1989,
Thornburgh rendered a decision that rejected Doherty's motion to reopen, and
ordered Doherty to be immediately deported to the United Kingdom. 3
Thornburgh determined that Doherty was ineligible for asylum status and
withholding of deportation. On January 19, 1990, Doherty appealed the decisions of both Attorneys General Meese and Thornburgh in Doherty v. Department of Justice (Doherty V). 33'
In the fifth Doherty decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the decisions of the Attorneys General under an abuse of discretion standard. 3" It first found that Attorney General Edwin Meese had not abused his
327. Id. at 944. Although Doherty argued that the appeal was frivolous, as the INS had never
rejected a country designation before, the Second Circuit disagreed with him, stating that the lack
of precedent did not render a claim frivolous. Id. at 941 n.3.
328. Doherty v. INS (Doherty V), 908 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1990). To be eligible for
asylum status, an applicant must fit within the parameters established by 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42)
(1988). See supra note 127 (describing the statute's definition of a refugee).
329. Doherty V, 908 F.2d at 1112.
330. Id.
331. Id. The BIA followed established case law that allowed a motion to reopen asylum hearings based on a well-founded fear of persecution. See Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421, 428
(1987) (relying on the international standard of the term "well-founded fear of persecution" to
deny petitioners' deportation).
332. Doherty V, 908 F.2d at 1113.
333. Id. at 1114.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1115. An abuse of discretion occurs if the Attorney General acts arbitrarily, departs
inexplicably from established policies, discriminates invidiously against a particular group, or
gives effect to considerations that Congress could not have intended to make relevant. See INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in determining
whether the BIA had incorrectly denied petitioner's motion to reopen deportation proceedings);
Aviles-Torres v. INS, 790 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing the lower court's decision
and ruling that the BIA had abused its discretion by basing its denial of petitioner's motion to
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discretion when he denied Ireland as the country of designation for deportation."3 6 The court stated that the Attorney General had the requisite authority
to deny a country designation based on reasonable grounds. 3 7
The court next turned to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh's decision.
It held that Thornburgh had abused his discretion in three different ways. 8'
First, Thornburgh had erred by using an improper legal standard to review
Doherty's evidence. 339 Second, the court found that Thornburgh had improperly determined the ultimate relief Doherty should receive under a motion to
reopen the asylum hearings.3"" The court noted that it was obvious that an
evidentiary hearing was needed, 3 4' and chastised Thornburgh for prejudging
the merits of Doherty's claim.342 Third, Thornburgh erred by rejecting Doherty's claim that his return to Ireland. would harm relations between the
United States and the United Kingdom.3 13 The court stated that a "decade of
practice confirms that the board's discretionary denials of asylum . . .have
been primarily for reasons of administrative fairness and efficiency, not to prereopen on factors deemed to be arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law); Wong Wing Hang v.
INS, 360 F.2d 715, 718 (2d Cir. 1966) ("IThe reviewing court shall set aside agency action...
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord with the
law."); Kaloudis v. Schaugnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950) (ruling that the BIA did not
abuse its discretion by denying petitioner's motions on grounds that Congress could not have intended to make relevant).
336. Doherty V,908 F.2d at 1113.
337. Id. Meese had denied the designation on two grounds: (a) "it is the policy of the United
States that those who commit acts of violence against a democratic state should receive swift and
lawful punishment, and it is thus in the interest of the United States that respondent serve his
sentence in the United Kingdom"; and (b) "a decision to deport respondent to Ireland rather than
the United Kingdom would be injurious to our relations with the United Kingdom." Id.
338. Id. at 1114.
339. Id. at 1116. Thornburgh had decided that Doherty had not established new unforeseeable
evidence to support his motion to reopen. The court rejected this argument, stating that "[n]either
the regulations nor the applicable decisional law require expressly or by implication that the new
evidence be 'unforeseeable'; indeed, such a rule would lead to absurd consequences." Id. at 1115.

The court noted that Doherty could not have foreseen that his country designation would be denied, as the Attorney General had never before rejected a country designation. Id. at 1116.
340. Id. at 1117.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1121. After an in-depth analysis o1 the legislative history of asylum law, the court
concluded that with the passage of the 1980 Immigration Act, Congress had intended to eliminate
the geographical and ideological considerations that had plagued the asylum process during much
of the twentieth century. Id.

For information on the history of asylum statutes, see generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael
H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981); Ira J. Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 865 (1982); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990); Michael H. Posner, Comments and Recommendations
on Proposed Reforms to United States Immigration Policy, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 883 (1982);
Kenneth D. Brill, Note, The Endless Debate: Refuge Law and Policy and the 1980 Refugee Act,
32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 117 (1983-84); Victoria I.. Potelicki, Note, United States Asylum Procedures: Current Status and Proposals for Reform, 14 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 405 (1981).
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serve our political relationship with the allegedly persecuting nation. 34
With one dissenting opinion,34' 5 a majority of the Second Circuit panel found
that Attorney General Thornburgh had abused his discretion, and remanded

the case to the immigration judge for asylum hearings. 46 However, the hearings will not be held, as the United States Supreme Court reversed the Second
47
Circuit's decision to reopen Doherty's asylum hearing.3
The Court found that neither Attorney General Meese nor Thornburgh had
abused their discretion in denying Doherty's motion to reopen his asylum hear-

ing.348 It decided that the denial of Doherty's country designation and the

change in Irish extradition law due to the new Ireland-Northern Ireland
Treaty did not qualify as new material evidence to support reopening. 349 Fur-

ther, the Court found that "withdrawing a claim for a tactical advantage is
not a reasonable explanation for failing to pursue the claim at an earlier hearing." ' 0 Thus, it denied Doherty's motion to reopen his asylum hearings. 51
One month after the Supreme Court's decision, INS officials deported Doherty
to the United Kingdom, and the United Kingdom promptly sent him to a
prison in Northern Ireland."'3
344. Doherty V,908 F.2d at 1120. The court also rejected Thornburgh's contention that Doherty had "waived" his right to apply for asylum when Doherty conceded deportability. Id. at
1122. Thornburgh argued that Doherty had "assumed the risk" that (a) Ireland might change its
extradition laws, and (b) Meese might deny his country designation. Id. The court found that this
reasoning "was incompatible with any motion to reopen." Id.
345. The dissenting judge found that the record supported Attorney General Thornburgh's decision. He contended that the Attorney General's word was final, and that Congress did not intend
to eliminate politi zal factors from the asylum process. Id. at 1125 (Lombard, J.,dissenting). He
further stated that Doherty had taken a calculated risk to admit deportability, and that Doherty
could not have a "second bite at the apple" just because Doherty had miscalculated. Id. at 1127
(Lombard, J., dissenting). The judge found that both Attorneys General had acted properly,
within the scope of their discretion. Id. at 1127, 1130 (Lombard, J., dissenting).
346. Doherty V,908 F.2d 938, 1122 (2d Cir. 1986).
347. See INS v. Doherty (Doherty VI), 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (1992) (Scalia, Stevens and Souter,
JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
348. Doherty VI, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4088.
349. Id. at 4088-89.
350. Id. at 4089.
351. Id. Meanwhile, Doherty petitioned the BIA, and then the district court, to release him
from jail. Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aj'd, 943 F.2d 204 (2d
Cir. 1991) (affirming the lower court's decision denying Doherty bail on the grounds that being
held for eight years in jail, without bond, does not violate a detainee's due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment).
352. See Ira Member, supra note 3, at I. Doherty's attorneys criticized the manner in which
the INS deported Doherty before dawn without notifying them. Id. They complained of being
"stonewalled when they sought to confirm his deportation." Id. Further, Doherty was deported
while his attorneys awaited a response from Attorney General William Barr on a formal request
for an asylum hearing for Doherty. See Tom Collins, Clock Strikes Midnight; Doherty Deported,
Ending His 9-Year Legal Battle in U.S., NEWSDAY, Feb. 20, 1992, at 3. In addition, over one
hundred United States Congresspersons were awaiting a response from the Supreme Court on a
formal request to rehear Doherty's case. Goldman, supra note 3, at Al.
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ANALYSIS

Doherty's case provides an excellent illustration of the principle of
nonrefoulement in action in both the extradition- and asylum-law contexts.
Although this concept is not expressly alluded to in the Doherty opinions, both
the district and appellate courts utilized nonrefoulement. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court ignored the principle of nonrefoulement by denying Doherty's
motion to reopen. If the Supreme Court had followed this principle, Doherty
currently would not be in Northern Ireland, as he falls under the international
and domestic definition of refugee, and he does not fall under any exceptions
to the use of nonrefoulement.
A.

Doherty Fits Within the International Definition of Refugee

The international definition of refugee requires an individual to have a
"well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of... political opinion. 3 5 8
Under this standard, Doherty is a refugee. He is a staunch supporter of the
PIRA, a group that is outlawed in Northern Ireland due to its anti-British
stance.35 4 Not only is membership in this group forbidden; any acts in which
this group participates also are taboo. Doherty's political beliefs are well
known and are reflected in his support of the PIRA. Upon his return to the
United Kingdom, Doherty is assured of being persecuted for his politics.
Prior to his flight to the United States, Doherty was tried and convicted
under the Diplock court system currently in place in Northern Ireland. This
system is renowned for its trampling of traditional due process criminal
rights. 55 Law enforcement officials may arrest anyone whom they reasonably
suspect may have committed a crime.""' Once detained, suspects have little
opportunity to seek advice from counsel before trial. 857 During trial, suspects
are not permitted to have a trial by jury, and any evidence presented is subject
to lower admissibility standards than usual.8 5 8 Doherty received a sentence of
59
life imprisonment under the Diplock system.1
Many scholars have criticized the Diplock court system as being fundamentally unfair.360 Congress voiced its opinion in 1986 when it amended the Sup353. 1951 Convention, supra note 53, art. 1(2). United States courts have determined that
there is a subjective component to this standard of fear, as fear is itself subjective. See INS v.
Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987).
354. See supra note 237 (discussing the IRA).
355. For a discussion of the Diplock court system, see supra notes 244-52, 259-64 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 247.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 251-52.
358. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
359. See Doherty V, 908 F.2d 1108, 1121 (2d Cir. 1990). It is interesting to note that a Republic of Ireland Court adjudicated the same case and gave Doherty a sentence of ten years. Id. at
1111.
360. See supra notes 253, 264 and accompanying text (describing criticisms of the Diplock
court system).
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plementary Extradition Treaty to include Article 3(a).

61

Both Congress and

jurists contend that the Diplock system violates a suspect's right to a fair trial

under several international conventions. 36 2 In
Diplock system would never pass constitutional
Any criminal conviction in Northern Ireland
Doherty may already have been persecuted
Diplock system.

63

addition, the provisions of the
standards in the United States.
is suspect, and it appears that
for his political views in the

Further, Doherty more than likely will face maltreatment in the Northern
Irish prison. Judicial authorities and human rights organizations have found

that conditions for Republicans in Northern Irish prisons violate international
law. 6 ' Human rights groups still monitor the prisons due to the high number
of complaints by Republican prisoners.365 Since his arrival at the Northern
Irish jail, Doherty may already have been subjected to persecution for his political beliefs.
Doherty also fit under the remaining sections of the 1951 Convention refugee definition, which requires the refugee to be "outside the country of his
nationality" and "unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that coun-

try."366 At the time of his asylum hearing, he was outside his country of origin

361. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (describing congressional reaction to the
Supplementary Extradition Treaty).
363. In addition to the life sentence he received under the Diplock court system, the record in
Doherty's case reflects that he, as well as his family, already have been subjected to persecution.
His counsel stated:
Family members have been subject to repeated arrest and interrogation. A sister's
home has been often raided by the security forces; on one such occasion, the security
forces seized the transcript of Mr. Doherty's testimony before Judge Sprizzo [the
extradition magistrate]. Relatives, friends, and neighbors have been victims and
targets of sectarian attacks running the gamut from beatings, to attempted murder, to
actual murder. Mr. Doherty's family and the other occupants of their tiny nationalist
enclave live subject to the intrusive daily presence in their homes and on the streets of
the British Army and the paramilitary Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). In addition to Mr. Doherty, a sister was interned by the British government and, as with
him, imprisoned without charges and without trial. The family home was destroyed
when bombed by loyalist paramilitaries. In addition, Mr. Doherty has already been
the victim of persecution in the United Kingdom, having been tortured and beaten
while in the custody of the security forces.
Brief for Respondent, INS v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1992) (1991 LEXIS
Genfed library, Brief file, at *11).
364. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text (discussing conditions in Northern Ireland
prisons). Before his removal to the United Kingdom, Doherty was quoted as stating:
I'm apprehensive of what is ahead. No one can guarantee [that] my rights won't be
infringed upon, there is no guarantee [that] I won't be physically hurt. My life is at
risk if I'm sent back to British jurisdiction. It is not the United States. There is no
First Amendment, no Fourth or Fifth. There is basically nothing there.
Gail Appleson, Doherty Says He Fears for Life on Return to Britain, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 1992
(a.m. cycle).
365. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
366. See 1951 Convention, supra note 53, art. 1(2).
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(Northern Ireland), and was unable and unwilling to return. The protection
Northern Ireland would provide for Doherty is dubious, given its criminal justice system and its exhaustive efforts to secure his extradition. Doherty was
unwilling to return to Northern Ireland and serve his sentence in a prison
where he might have faced persecution for his political views. Therefore, Doherty satisfies the international definition of refugee contained in the 1951
Convention. He also satisfies the United States definition.
B. Doherty Fits Within the United States' Refugee Standard
The United States definition of refugee parallels the international definition,
with one exception. The United States definition precludes individuals from
receiving the protection of nonrefoulement if they fall under six exclusionary
categories.3 67 In contrast, the international definition excludes individuals if
they fall under four of the six United States categories." 8 The United States
definition is much more narrow and much more difficult to utilize than its
international counterpart. If Doherty survives the U.S. exclusions, he automatically survives the international exclusions.
The first two limitations bar nonrefoulement if the individual falls outside
the refugee definition, or is firmly resettled in a foreign country. 369 As Doherty
falls under the definition of refugee, he satisfies the first condition. Second,
Doherty did not firmly resettle in a third country. One could argue that since
Doherty had been living in New York City from 1981 to 1992, he had resettled. However, the United States is not a third country in this situation, as it
was a party to the extradition, the asylum, and the deportation proceedings.
Further, Doherty was incarcerated in the Manhattan Correctional Center
from 1983 to 1992-hardly a firm resettlement of his choice. 7 0 Thus, Doherty
easily side-steps the first two bars to nonrefoulement.
The next two provisions prohibit the use of nonrefoulement if the individual
has been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime, or if the
individual himself participated in the persecution of others on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 371 These two restrictions really concern whether the refugee has engaged
in acts of terrorism. Doherty has not.
Under the theory of permissible targets outlined in the Geneva Conventions, 372 parties and participants of the conflict are permissible targets. Doherty is a permissible target for an attack by Unionist groups or British Security Forces. Similarly, members of Unionist or British Security groups are
permissible targets for Republican attacks. Geneva law stresses that groups
367. See supra text accompanying notes 127-29 (listing the United States exclusion
categories).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68 (listing exclusions under international law).
369. 8 C.F.R. § 208.8 (1988).
370. See Doherty V,908 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1990).
371. See 8 C.F.R. §208.8.

372. See supra text accompanying notes 273-76 (discussing the theory of permissible targets).
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not participating in the strife are impermissible targets.3 " Thus, the Republican and Unionist groups must avoid random or indiscriminate injury to the
lives or property of innocent civilians. They will not violate international law if
they exclusively attack one another.
Doherty's participation in the Republican ambush of British Security Forces
did not violate international law. British Security Forces are a permissible target under the Geneva Conventions. The ambush neither injured nor destroyed
civilian lives or property. Further, Doherty behaved properly as a soldier under
the St. Petersburg Declaration.37 ' His purpose was to weaken the enemy forces
by disabling enemy soldiers. The ambush did not violate any combat rules.
Rather, it was a legitimate action in a noninternational armed conflict. 375
Terrorism is defined as "reckless applications of violence against innocent
individuals . . . for the purpose of obtaining a military, political or religious

end."'37 Admittedly, the PIRA ambushed the British Security Forces to
achieve both a military and political end. The PIRA wanted to decrease the
number of British Security Forces, as well as make a political statement
against direct rule. However, the central element of terrorism is the application of violence to innocent people.3 77 The ambush did not include acts of violence against impermissible targets. This notion was voiced by district court
Judge Sprizzo, who expressly stated that the ambush did not cause "indiscriminate killing.137 8 In addition, other courts have found that attacks on police
and military forces are not acts of persecution. 79 Thus, Doherty did not participate in a terrorist act, and passes the third and fourth statutory bars to
nonrefoulement.
The fifth statutory bar prohibits nonrefoulement if the refugee is a national
security risk to the United States.380 Doherty posed no threat to national security. First, he was incarcerated for almost a decade. Second, his fight is
against the Unionist and British groups in Northern Ireland-not against any
faction in the United States. Further, Doherty fights for what he perceives to
be societal good. He is not a cold-blooded, hardened criminal who kills for
personal gain. Rather, Doherty acted to improve society.3 81 Thus, he is not a
373. See supra text accompanying notes 273-76.

374. See supra text accompanying notes 270-72 (examining the St. Petersburg Declaration).
375. See supra text accompanying note 277 (depicting the Northern Irish conflict as noninternational strife).
376. See Blakesley, supra note 176, at 902-03.
377. Id.
378. See Doherty 1, 599 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
379. See In re Fuentes-Sanchez, 19 1. & N. Dec. 658 (1988); In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 811 (1988) ("Congress did not intend to restrict asylum and withholding only to those
who take no part in armed conflict."). Further, as Doherty's counsel stated, "Doherty's conduct
does not constitute persecution and could not, or else all members of armed opposition groups
would be barred from asylum and the withholding of deportation." See Brief of Respondent, INS
v. Doherty, 60 U.S.L.W. 4085 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1991) (No. 90-925) (available on 1991 LEXIS,
Genfed library, Brief file, at *24).
380. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.8 (1988).
381. See WIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 64.
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threat either to the community or to national security.
The final limitation on the principle of nonrefoulement is activated if the
refugee has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United
States.3 82 A nonpolitical crime would be one that is excluded from the political
offense exception to extradition. The district court encountered this issue during Doherty's extradition hearing. The court analyzed the issue by considering
the scope of the political offense exception, the type of group involved in the
political act, the act itself, and whether any innocent people were hurt by the
act. 83 The court concluded that the ambush was a "classic" example of a
political crime under the political offense exception, and refused to grant the
United Kingdom's extradition request. 38' Two appellate courts later affirmed
this decision.38 Doherty's crime was political. Therefore, he successfully closes
the final statutory exception to nonrefoulement.
As shown above, Doherty falls within the international and domestic definitions of refugee. He therefore is protected by the principle of nonrefoulement.
Thus, Doherty should not have been forced to fight a deportation battle
against the United States. Once he circumvented the United Kingdom's extradition request, the United States should 'have willingly opened its doors to Doherty. The United States traditionally prides itself on sheltering refugees who
have been persecuted for political opinion. In this case, however, the United
States refused to shelter Doherty.
C.

The United States Has Engaged in Disguised Extradition

The United States Government, through its executive branch (the INS),
used immigration laws to accomplish what its courts would not allow-the
return of Doherty to the United Kingdom. The use of immigration laws to
extradite an individual is referred to as "disguised extradition." 386 In this instance, disguised extradition violates the customary international norm of
nonrefoulement. The United States sent Doherty back to the United Kingdom
and thus to Northern Ireland, where he probably will face persecution on account of his Republican views. Doherty"s extradition was blocked due to the
political offense exception, which incorporates the principle of nonrefoulement.
In using deportation statutes to return Doherty to Northern Ireland, however,
the United States engaged in disguised extradition, which directly violates
nonrefoulement. The United States blatantly ignored a fundamental principle
of international law.
Many scholars have criticized states for using immigration laws as disguised
extradition. 87 Most of this criticism centers on the limited rights of the fugi382. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.8.
383. See Doherty 1, 599 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

384. Id.
385. See Doherty 11, 786 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1986); Doherty I1. 615 F. Supp. 755, 760
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).

386. See supra text accompanying notes 216-25 (discussing use of disguised extradition).
BASSIOUNI supra note 131, at 49, VIIJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 89; Kennedy et

387. See I
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tives under disguised methods of extradition. 8' Extradition treaties usually secure at least a minimal due process standard for the extraditee. Certain requirements must be met prior to extradition, and both the judiciary and
executive authorities must agree before granting a request. Courts should refuse to try individuals in deportation proceedings once their extradition has
been denied. Resorting to immigration procedures subjects the extraditee to an
entirely different legal procedure without the constitutional 'safeguards found
under the extradition process. 89
Another criticism of the use of disguised immigration procedures for extradition is that it is much easier on officials and creates a frame of mind that
immigration procedures should be used for administrative convenience.390 As
in Doherty's case, officials often resort to deportation proceedings when extradition appears impossible because one of the procedural or substantive elements is not fulfilled, or because a court has found the individual nonextraditable. The United States Supreme Court has never upheld the use of
certain laws for mere administrative convenience; immigration courts should
follow its lead. As one scholar states, "[T]he rights of the requested person
should not be sacrificed to the requirements of a more efficient and a speedier
administration of justice." ''
In addition, the use of immigration laws as disguised extradition impairs the
integrity of the extradition process. International spotlights focus on the actions of the developed nations. If the United States resorts to backhanded
means, it sets a bad example and threatens to bring about the demise of international criminal cooperation through legal extradition procedures. Also, it is
difficult for the extraditee to accuse INS officials of substituting immigration
procedures for extradition.
This calls into question the good faith of the entire
3 92
executive branch.
Moreover, the most damaging aspect of the government's conduct is that
two alternatives exist to its use of de facto extradition. The United Kingdom,
at any time, had the ability to refile another extradition request. By avoiding
this option, it appears that the United Kingdom is fearful of Article 3(a), and
its application to the Diplock court system in Northern Ireland. Given the fact
that several convictions of IRA members have been recently overturned due to
illegally obtained confessions,39 3 a United States Court facing a second United
Kingdom extradition request most likely would find that Doherty would not
receive fair treatment in the United Kingdom, and would keep Doherty in the
United States.
al., supra note 228, at 13; Weis, supra note 104, at 34.
388. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (reflecting criticism of disguised
extradition).
389. See EVANS & MURPHY, supra note 166, at 99.
390. Id. at 103.
391. WjJNGAERT, supra note 160, at 59.
392. Id.
393. See Steven Prokesch, Convictions Overturned for 7 in I.R.A. Blasts, N.Y.TIMES, June 27,
1991, at A7.
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Instead of deporting Doherty, the United States could have permitted him
to resettle in a friendly third country. This option would have preserved
nonrefoulement. Instead, the government continually refused to send Doherty
to any other country besides the United Kingdom. This refusal supports the
conclusion that the United States not only is willing, but actually did violate
both domestic and international law to return Doherty to the United Kingdom.
The use of immigration laws by the government in Doherty's case hurts all
parties involved: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Doherty. The
United States is injured in international circles for its exhaustive backhanded
efforts to return Doherty to its good ally the United Kingdom. The United
Kingdom is ridiculed by Republican groups, who mock its exhaustive efforts to
put Doherty in prison on its soil. These efforts have memorialized Doherty as a
"folk hero" and as "a leading symbol of opposition to British rule in Northern
Ireland." 3 ' Further, Doherty has been incarcerated for almost a decade. The
use of deportation proceedings against him arguably deprived him of due process rights similar to those he lost in front of the Diplock courts in Northern
Ireland. Most importantly, the use of disguised extradition violated Doherty's
right to the protection of nonrefoulement 5
The principle of nonrefoulement protected Doherty in the extradition process through the political offense exception. Similarly, if the process were
properly followed, it would have protected him in the asylum and withholding
of deportation processes. Unfortunately, the United States subverted the process that has developed over several decades to protect the refugee.
IV.

IMPACT

Prior to Doherty's deportation, there were three possible outcomes to the
Doherty case: (1) the executive branch could have granted Doherty asylum;
(2) the United Kingdom could have filed a second extradition request under
the Supplementary Treaty; or (3) the executive branch could have deported
Doherty to the United Kingdom. Of these: three outcomes, the second possibility is preferred.
394. See Goldman, supra note 3, at Al.
395. A practical solution for the United States' dilemma of injuring Doherty's rights through
the use of immigration laws as disguised extradition on the one hand, and injuring its relations
with the United Kingdom by denying its extradition request on the other, would have been for the
United States to employ the doctrine of aut dedere aut judicare. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing this doctrine).
Use of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare would have been a good solution for all three
parties. The United States would have eliminated its (and Congress') concern that Doherty would
not receive fair treatment in the highly charged atmosphere surrounding his political crime. The
United Kingdom would have eliminated its concern that Doherty would go unpunished. Doherty
would have received a fair trial if retried-if not, he would have received good treatment in
United States prisons, and probably credit for time served. Most importantly, the choice between
extradition or prosecution maintains the principle of nonrefoulement-Doherty would not have
been returned to a country where he may face persecution on account of his Republican views.
Unfortunately, the United States rarely acknowledges the viability of this practical alternative.

19921

JOSEPH DOHERTY AND THE INS

The first scenario envisions INS officials granting Doherty either asylum
status or withholding of deportation. If granted asylum status, Doherty would
have remained in the United States. If granted withholding of deportation,
Doherty would have been able to designate a friendly third country to which
he would have been deported. Neither option would have sent him back to the
United Kingdom, and neither course would have violated the principle of
nonrefoulement.
Some may argue that the asylum or withholding of deportation solution
does little to promote international cooperation in the suppression of crime,
and might strain relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom would suffer a humiliating defeat in Northern Ireland, much to the delight of Republican groups. In addition, Doherty would
evade responsibility for his act and escape punishment. While this solution
reflects the traditional American policy of sheltering political fugitives, its onesided approach does not equally balance the competing goals of nonrefoulement and the suppression of crime.
However, the underhanded tactics used by the United States in the Doherty
case, and the extraordinarily long time Doherty has sat in jail serve to tip the
balance in favor of Doherty. He already has served time for participating in
the ambush. Justice would have been better served if both the United Kingdom and the United States had abandoned their backhanded methods.
The second scenario envisions the United Kingdom filing a second extradition request under the Supplementary Treaty. This approach is most desirable,
as (a) it would give the United Kingdom another chance at extradition, (b) it
avoids disguised extradition, and (c) it follows the properly established avenue
of recourse for unsatisfied requesting states.
If given the chance to apply the Supplementary Treaty to Doherty, a court
undoubtedly would have been persuaded by the McMullen case, and might
have found that the treaty, as applied to Doherty, constitutes an unlawful bill
of attainder.396 Even if the court chose not to agree with the result in McMullen, under Article 3(a) of the new treaty, it would have examined the fate that
397
awaited Doherty if returned to the United Kingdom or Northern Ireland.
Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty allows the examining court to prohibit extradition where the fugitive may face persecution, unfair treatment, or
an unfair trial if returned.398 The article embodies the principle of nonrefoulement and protects Irish fugitives from persecution. It is more than likely that
a reviewing court in this situation would have barred Doherty's extradition to
the United Kingdom under Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty.
This second approach allows the United Kingdom to save face by giving it
one more chance at extradition. It also allows the executive branch to main396. See McMullen v. United States, 953 F.2d 761 (2d. Cir. 1992).
397. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 154, art. I. Under this treaty, Doherty's crime
would not fall under the political offense exception to extradition, because murder is not considered to be a political crime under Article 1.
398. Id.
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tain good relations with the United Kingdom, as Congress, not the executive
branch, inserted Article 3(a) into the treaty at the last minute. Finally, the
Supplementary Treaty allows courts to adhere to the principle of nonrefoulement. Doherty would have received protection against persecution under Article 3(a) of the Supplementary Treaty. With nonrefoulement, Doherty would
have been able to thwart the government's attempts to return him to the
United Kingdom.
Instead of utilizing the other two options, the executive branch secretly deported Doherty to the United Kingdom. In doing so, the executive branch
stooped to "disguised extradition"-a backhanded method designed to bring
about extradition when the legitimate extradition route fails. This method deprived Doherty of the protection embodied in nonrefoulement. This option is
most damaging, for Doherty undoubtedly will face persecution on account of
his political views in Northern Ireland. Doherty's deportation to Northern Ireland clearly violates both domestic and international law.
CONCLUSION

The principle of nonrefoulement preserves the interests of the political offender, the requesting country, and the asylum country in the areas of extradition and political asylum. The principle is based on humanitarian concerns,
and thus protects the political offender from maltreatment and the highly
charged and unbalanced judicial process he would face if returned to the requesting country. As nonrefoulement does not apply to international crimes, it
allows states to carry out their missions to combat international terrorism by
punishing political offenders who commit terrorist acts. Finally, this norm allows the asylum state both to remain neutral in a sensitive foreign relations
area, as well as to ensure that the rights of the political fugitive will be
preserved.
It is vital that all nations strive to preserve and uphold the protections and
guarantees of nonrefoulement. It is not a political tool for nations to use to
their advantages, as the United States (lid in the Doherty case. The umbrella
of protection provided by nonrefoulement covers individuals-not states-and
should remain permanently open to preserve a refugee's rights under international law.
Wendy L. Fink

